Economic science and political influence
Article dans une revue: When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order to influence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of measurement infrastructures such as national statistical institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between different schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and finally how the attempt to preserve influence can lead to degenerative research programs.
Auteur(s)
Gilles Saint-Paul
Revue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
Date de publication
- 2013
Mots-clés
- Economic science
- Politicla influence
Pages
- 1004-1031
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1
Volume
- 11