Endogenous preferences in games with Type-Indeterminate Players
Article dans une revue: The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we extend the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making and show that TI-games open a new field of strategic interaction. We first establish an equivalence result between static games of incomplete information and static TI-games. We next develop a new solution concept for non-commuting dynamic TI-games. The updating rule captures the novelty brought about by Type Indeterminacy namely that in addition to affecting information and payoffs, the action of a player impacts on the profile of types. We provide an example showing that TI-game predictions cannot be obtained as Bayes Nash equilibrium of the corresponding classical game.
Auteur(s)
Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky
Revue
- AAAI Press Menlo Park
Date de publication
- 2010
Mots-clés
- Type indeterminacy
- Games
- Endogeneous preferences
Pages
- 70-77
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1