Externalities in Economies with Endogenous Sharing Rules
Article dans une revue: Endogenous sharing rules were introduced by Simon and Zame [16] to model payoff indeterminacy in discontinuous games. They prove the existence in every compact strategic game of a mixed Nash equilibrium and an associated sharing rule. We extend their result to economies with externalities [1] where, by definition, players are restricted to pure strategies. We also provide a new interpretation of payoff indeterminacy in Simon and Zame's model in terms of preference incompleteness.
Auteur(s)
Philippe Bich, Rida Laraki
Revue
- Economic Theory Bulletin
Date de publication
- 2017
Mots-clés JEL
Mots-clés
- Incomplete and Discontinuous Preferences
- Rasian Equilibrium
- Wal
- Better Reply Security
- Economies
- Generalized Games
- Endogenous Sharing Rules
Pages
- 127-137
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1
Volume
- 5