Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations

Article dans une revue: This paper analyzes farsighted stability when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying the two properties of justifiability and maximality and define stable alternatives as unique stationary points of the expectation function of some agent. We characterize stable alternatives in one-to-one matching models and voting models, and show that the relaxation of the hypothesis of common expectations greatly expands the set of states that can be supported as farsightedly stable.

Auteur(s)

Francis Bloch, Anne van den Nouweland

Revue
  • Games and Economic Behavior
Date de publication
  • 2020
Mots-clés JEL
C71 D72 D74
Mots-clés
  • Farsighted stable sets
  • Heterogeneous expectations
  • One-to-one matching
  • Voting
  • Effectivity functions
Pages
  • 32-54
Version
  • 1
Volume
  • 121