Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem with incomplete preferences
Article dans une revue: We provide a generalization of Harsanyi (1955)'s aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the individual and social level. Individuals and society have possibly incomplete expected utility preferences that are represented by sets of expected utility functions. Under Pareto indifference, social preferences are represented through a set of aggregation rules that are utilitarian in a generalized sense. Strengthening Pareto indifference to Pareto preference provides a refinement of the representation.
Auteur(s)
Eric Danan, Thibault Gajdos, Jean-Marc Tallon
Revue
- American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Date de publication
- 2015
Mots-clés JEL
Mots-clés
- Incomplete preferences
- Aggregation
- Expected multi-utility
- Utilitarianism
Pages
- 61-69
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1
Volume
- 7