Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of `sour grapes’ behavior
Article dans une revue: This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstating is useless but the replacement heuristics is consequential. The paper argues that the “replacing” manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior, and study its effects. The conclusion is that the Alternative Vote should not be considered as immune to manipulation.
Auteur(s)
Jean-François Laslier
Revue
- Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics
Date de publication
- 2016
Mots-clés
- Alternative vote
- Single transferable vote
- Manipulation
- Behavioral voting
Pages
- 57-76
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1
Volume
- 33