Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism

Article dans une revue: We deal with the problem of providing incentives for the implementation of competitive outcomes in a pure-exchange economy with finitely many households. We construct a feasible price-quantity mechanism, which fully implements Walras equilibria via Nash equilibria in fairly general environments. Traders' preferences need neither to be ordered nor continuous. In addition, the mechanism is such that no pure strategy is weakly dominated, hence is bounded (in the sense of Jackson 1992). In particular it makes no use of any integer game.

Auteur(s)

Gaël Giraud, Hubert Stahn

Revue
  • Review of Economic Design
Date de publication
  • 2013
Mots-clés JEL
C72 D50
Mots-clés
  • Strategic boundedness
  • Weakly dominated strategy
  • Mechanism design
Pages
  • 43-62
Version
  • 1
Volume
  • 17