Non-Bayesian updating in a social learning experiment
Article dans une revue: In our laboratory experiment, subjects, in sequence, have to predict the value of a good. The second subject in the sequence makes his prediction twice: first (“first belief”), after he observes his predecessor's prediction; second (“posterior belief”), after he observes his private signal. We find that the second subjects weigh their signal as a Bayesian agent would do when the signal confirms their first belief; they overweight the signal when it contradicts their first belief. This way of updating, incompatible with Bayesianism, can be explained by the Likelihood Ratio Test Updating (LRTU) model, a generalization of the Maximum Likelihood Updating rule. It is at odds with another family of updating, the Full Bayesian Updating. In another experiment, we directly test the LRTU model and find support for it.
Auteur(s)
Roberta de Filippis, Antonio Guarino, Philippe Jehiel, Toru Kitagawa
Revue
- Journal of Economic Theory
Date de publication
- 2022
Mots-clés JEL
Mots-clés
- Ambiguous belief updating
- Multiple priors
- Social learning
- Experiment
Pages
- 105188
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1
Volume
- 199