On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts

Article dans une revue: The literature on ascending combinatorial auctions yields conflicting insights regarding the possibility to implement the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. We introduce the class of minimal ascending auctions, a class which allows one to disconnect the final payments from the final bids but which prohibits the raising of the price vector of a provisionally winning bidder. We first establish the impossibility of implementing the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. Second, we propose a minimal ascending auction that yields a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium thanks to payment discounts.

Auteur(s)

Laurent Lamy

Revue
  • Games and Economic Behavior
Date de publication
  • 2012
Mots-clés JEL
C70 D44
Mots-clés
  • Ascending auctions
  • Combinatorial auctions
  • Bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium
  • Core-selecting auctions
  • Vickrey payoffs
Pages
  • 990-999
Version
  • 1
Volume
  • 75