Optimal redistribution with unobservable disability: Welfarist versus non-welfarist social objectives

Article dans une revue: This paper examines the optimal non-linear income and commodity tax when the same labor disutility can receive two alternative interpretations, taste for leisure or disability, but the disability is not readily observable. We compare the optimal policy under alternative social objectives, welfarist and non-welfarist, and conclude that the non-welfarist objective, in which the planner gives a higher weight to the disutility of labor of the disabled individuals, is the only reasonable specification. It has some foundation in the theory of responsibility; further, unlike the other specifications it yields an optimal solution that may involve a lower labor supply requirement from disabled individuals.

Auteur(s)

Pierre Pestieau, Maria Racionero

Revue
  • European Economic Review
Date de publication
  • 2009
Mots-clés JEL
H21 H41
Mots-clés
  • Optimal non-linear taxation
  • Quasi-linear preferences
  • Asymmetric information
  • Responsibility
Pages
  • 636-644
Version
  • 1
Volume
  • 53