Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities
Article dans une revue: This paper derives optimal top tax rate formulas in a model where top earners respond to taxes through three channels: labor supply, tax avoidance, and compensation bargaining. The optimal top tax rate increases when there are zero-sum compensation-bargaining effects. We present empirical evidence consistent with bargaining effects. Top tax rate cuts are associated with top one percent pretax income shares increases but not higher economic growth. US CEO "pay for luck" is quantitatively more prevalent when top tax rates are low. International CEO pay levels are negatively correlated with top tax rates, even controlling for firms' characteristics and performance.
Auteur(s)
Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, Stefanie Stantcheva
Revue
- American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Date de publication
- 2014
Mots-clés JEL
Mots-clés
- Optimal Taxation
- Top Labor Incomes
Pages
- 230-271
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1
Volume
- 6