Patents as Collateral

Article dans une revue: This paper studies how the assignment of patents as collateral determines the savings of firms and magnifies the effect of innovative rents on investment in research and development (R&D). We analyse the behaviour of innovative firms that face random and lumpy investment opportunities in R&D. High growth rates of innovations, possibly higher than the real rate of interest, may be achieved despite financial constraints. There is an optimal level of publicly funded policy by the patent and trademark office that minimizes the legal uncertainty surrounding patents as collateral and maximizes the growth rate of innovations.

Auteur(s)

Bruno Amable, Jean-Bernard Chatelain, Kirsten Ralf

Revue
  • Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Date de publication
  • 2010
Mots-clés JEL
D92 G24 G32 O16 O34 O41
Mots-clés
  • Collateral Patents Research and development Credit rationing Growth Innovation
Pages
  • 1092-1104
Version
  • 1
Volume
  • 34