Rumors and Social Networks

Pré-publication, Document de travail: Why do people spread rumors? This paper studies the transmission of possibly false information—by rational agents who seek the truth. Unbiased agents earn payoffs when a collective decision is correct in that it matches the true state of the world, which is initially unknown. One agent learns the underlying state and chooses whether to send a true or false message to her friends and neighbors who then decide whether or not to transmit it further. The papers hows how a social network can serve as a filter. Agents block messages from parts of the network that contain many biased agents; the messages that circulate may be incorrect but sufficiently informative as to the correct decision.

Auteur(s)

Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange, Rachel Kranton

Date de publication
  • 2014
Mots-clés
  • Bayesian updating
  • Rumors
  • Misinformation
  • Social networks
Référence interne
  • PSE Working Papers n°2014-15
Version
  • 1