Sovereign default and imperfect tax enforcement

Pré-publication, Document de travail: The effect of fiscal policy on default risk is mitigated by the response of tax compliance. To explore the consequences of this stylized fact, we build a model of sovereign debt with limited commitment and imperfect tax enforcement. Fiscal policy persistently affects the size of the informal economy, which impacts future fiscal revenues and default risk. The interaction of imperfect tax enforcement and limited commitment strongly constrains the dynamics of optimal fiscal policy and leads to costly uctuations in consumption.

Auteur(s)

Francesco Pappadà, Yanos Zylberberg

Date de publication
  • 2021
Mots-clés JEL
E02 E32 E62 F41 H20
Mots-clés
  • Sovereign default
  • Imperfect tax enforcement
  • Fiscal policy
Référence interne
  • PSE Working Papers n°2021-09
Version
  • 1