Taxes, minimum-quality standards and/or product labeling to improve environmental quality and welfare: Experiments can provide answers
Article dans une revue: This study focuses on the welfare impact of taxes, minimum-quality standards, and/or product labeling. A theoretical framework shows that the combination of a label and a per-unit tax is socially optimal. Alternatively, if the label is unavailable, the theory cannot directly conclude which instrument should be socially preferred. Estimations of willingness-to-pay (WTP) are useful for completing the theoretical analysis and evaluating policies ex ante on case-by-case basis. Using hypothetical WTP for shrimp, we confirm that the combination of a label and a tax is socially optimal. In the absence of a label, simulations show that a minimum-quality standard leads to a higher welfare compared to a tax.
Auteur(s)
Anne-Célia Disdier, Stéphan Marette
Revue
- Journal of Regulatory Economics
Date de publication
- 2012
Mots-clés JEL
Mots-clés
- Regulatory instruments
- Environment
- Stated preference experiment
- Willingness-to-pay
Pages
- 337-357
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1
Volume
- 41