The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
Article dans une revue: We consider standard auction models when bidders' identities are not-or are only partially-observed by the econometrician. We first adapt the definition of identifiability to a framework with anonymous bids and explore the extent to which anonymity reduces the possibility of identifying private value auction models. Second, in the asymmetric independent private value model which is nonparametrically identified, we generalize Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong's estimation procedure [Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions, Econometrica 68 (2000) 525-574] and consider the asymptotic properties of our multi-step kernel-based estimator. Monte Carlo simulations illustrate the practical relevance of our estimation procedure in small data sets.
Auteur(s)
Laurent Lamy
Revue
- Econometrics
Date de publication
- 2012
Mots-clés JEL
Mots-clés
- Auctions
- Nonparametric identification
- Nonparametric estimation
- Unobserved heterogeneity
- Anonymous bids
- Uniform convergence rate
Pages
- 113-132
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1
Volume
- 167