Seminars

Behavior Work Group

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Thursday 6 June 2024 10:00-11:00
R1.09
GALLEGATI Giacomo (PSE) : *
Thursday 6 June 2024 10:00-11:00
R1.09
GALLEGATI Giacomo (PSE) : Don’t judge the paper by its cover
Abstract
Biases in the peer review process can result in disparities in how scholarly work is assessed, unfairly affecting the careers and opportunities of researchers. In this paper, we conduct a randomised field experiment to explore the role of affiliation biases in the peer review process of an early career workshop in economics. When affiliation is displayed, we find significant increases in paper grades and the probability of being accepted to the conference
Friday 17 May 2024 11:00-12:00
MSE salle 115
KLOPFENSTEIN Aurélien : Cognitive Barriers to Impact Investing
Abstract
Sustainable investing has been gaining traction as a means to speed up the environmental transition. Recent theoretical work highlights that a sustainable investor looking to maximize their impact should focus not just on their own stocks' emissions, but should also internalize the whole market's emissions – following a broad mandate. Sustainable investors should therefore coordinate with other fellow sustainable investors, as well as with the market as a whole. The goal of this project is to explore behavioral barriers to broad-mandate investing. In a first experiment, we find that some market structures make broad-mandate investing very counterintuitive for investors, irrespective of their preferences. Further experiments are planned in order to identify the precise cognitive mechanism at play
Thursday 25 April 2024 10:00-11:00
R2.21
MAYAUX Damien (PSE) : Utility and Contrast in Evidence Accumulation Models
Thursday 25 April 2024 10:00-11:00
R2-21
MAYAUX Damien (PSE) : Utility and Contrast in Evidence Accumulation Models
Abstract
Combining response times to choice data helps reveal preferences when decision-makers make mistakes. Evidence accumulation models, such as the Decision Diffusion Model (DDM) or the Linear Ballistic Accumulator, generate a joint distribution of choice and response times given a set of alternatives and their utility. These models have been shown to fit equally well empirical data for a given choice set. However, they generate diverging predictions about the effect of changing the utility of an alternative. In this paper, I clarify theoretically how utility enters these models and how they can be used for revealing preferences. I characterize evidence accumulation models by their range – the set of all distributions that can be generated - and their contrast - the extent to which increasing the utility of one alternative slows down the choice of another. Evidence accumulation models have a similar range, but disagree on the contrast. One implication is that all these models would be equally suitable for revealing preferences if their contrast was properly calibrated.. I propose a tractable framework for this aim and give general conditions under which it is applicable. I illustrate my theoretical results with simulated data from a DDM model.
Friday 5 April 2024 11:00-12:00
MSE ( Salle 115)
FERNANDEZ-URBANO Roger : How Locus of Control Predicts Subjective Well-being and its Inequality: The Moderating Role of Social Values
Abstract
Previous research has established the central role of an individuals' locus of control (LoC) in influencing subjective well-being. However, earlier studies have predominantly omitted an exploration of potential moderating factors at the country-level and have rarely delved into the influence of LoC on an important yet often-overlooked dimension of well-being—namely, subjective well-being inequality. Addressing these gaps, this study examines the association between individuals' LoC and subjective well-being, considering both the mean and inequality aspects. Additionally, it explores the moderating influence of country’s social values, particularly the individualism-collectivism dimension. Utilizing data from the Integrated Values Survey, comprising 170,000 individuals across 37 countries from 1996 to 2022, our study confirms a strong positive relationship between LoC and subjective well-being while also unveiling a strong negative relationship with subjective well-being inequality. Moreover, it demonstrates that country’s social values exert significant moderation effects on the relationship between LoC and subjective well-being, affecting both the mean level and inequality aspects, albeit in opposing directions. By employing the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, our findings support the importance of structural effects. Understanding how increasing LoC shapes people’s wellbeing in a society holds implications for policymaking and contributes to ongoing discussions on collective choice and inequality
Thursday 29 February 2024 10:00-11:00
R1-09
DA COSTA Shaun (PSE) : *
Friday 12 January 2024 11:00-12:00
MSE Salle 114
SCHÜTZ Rafael : The limits to universalism
Abstract
Surveys, ballot measures, donations, and consumer spending alike reveal a growing concern for the welfare of animals. What is driving this phenomenon? Does it follow a general shift toward more universalist attitudes, or are social preferences for humans and animals substitutes? I propose a representative survey experiment to measure the distribution, interdependence, and determinants of universalist attitudes toward various human or animal out-groups. Attitudes would be elicited in two ways: (1) via previously validated hypothetical money allocation tasks between an in-group member and an out-group representative; (2) by allowing respondents to make donations to NGOs that focus on a specific out-group. Subjects would be randomly exposed to a narrative about a direct, positive interaction between an in-group member and an out-group member. This would allow to study the role of perceived distance to the out-group in shaping other-regarding preferences
Thursday 14 December 2023 10:00-11:00
R1-14
LAGO RODRÍGUEZ Manuel Estevo : Unraveling Gender Norms: The power of information provision on the preferential promotion of women
Abstract
In this paper, we study whether variations in gender norms and, significantly, separating the effects of 1st and 2nd order beliefs can affect attitudes towards the preferential promotion of women to senior-level positions. We examine whether providing information on what others believe to be socially acceptable (2nd order) and information that may change personal beliefs (1st order) impacts attitudes towards promoting women. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that aims to disentangle the causal effect of 1st and 2nd order beliefs separately in the context of gender norms
Friday 17 November 2023 10:00-11:00
SALLE 115 , MSE
VARDAXOGLOU Laurence (PSE) : Effect of misinformation on voting in the laboratory
SAVEY Lily
Abstract
For health-related matters, being misinformed leads individuals to make bad decisions. In politics, it is less obvious. Although misinformation has been shown to influence voting decisions, this is not necessarily a deviation from rational voting. An individual might indeed be tricked into a non-rational voting decision, or motivated to opt for the candidate who maximises the utility of their vote. Our aim is to explore the extent to which different kinds of misinformation obstruct rational voting. We propose to study rational voting in the laboratory, as it allows us to control for important factors that are inevitably imprecisely measured using survey data.
Thursday 19 October 2023 10:00-11:00
R1-14
WEBB Duncan (PSE) : Silence to Solidarity: Using Group Dynamics to Reduce Anti-Transgender Discrimination in India
Abstract
Discrimination is often believed to be the result of deep-seated prejudice against a minority, or of beliefs that can only change upon the revelation of new information. But social context — in particular, how people behave differently in groups — may be a more important determinant of discrimination than traditional theories of discrimination suggest. This paper shows that involving majority-group members in a group discussion and hiring decision can sharply reduce hiring discrimination against a stigmatized minority. I focus on discrimination against the transgender community in India, a highly visible and economically vulnerable group. In a control condition, participants on average sacri?ce almost double their daily food expenditure to avoid selecting a transgender individual to deliver food to their home. But if they were earlier involved in a group discussion and collective hiring decision with two of their neighbours, they no longer discriminate at all, even when making subsequent choices in private. This effect is stronger than the effect of informing people about the legal rights of transgender people, and the reduction in discrimination partially persists until around 1 month later. The results appear to be driven by the emergence of a strong pro-trans norm in the groups, supported by pro-social reasons for selecting transgender workers that persuade others to discriminate less.
Friday 29 September 2023 11:00-12:00
MSE salle S18
MAYAUX Damien (PSE) : Welfare effects of salient marketing cues
Abstract
Online marketplaces are full of salient-yet-ambiguous marketing cues that steer consumers towards specific items. Platforms enjoy great freedom in choosing how cues look like (visual design) and which products they are assigned to (attribution mechanism). I study in an online choice experiment the effect of some visual design / attribution mechanism pairs on consumer choice and welfare. My main hypothesis is that, for some visual designs that are overtly positive - a golden thumb, a green circle - participants tend to follow blindly the cue no matter if it is assigned on good or bad items, while for some other visual designs that are salient but less positive - a blue road sign or a message in black font with capital letters - participants perform better than without the cue when it is on the best items and comparably to this baseline otherwise.
Thursday 9 March 2023 10:00-11:00
ANLLO Hernan (ENS) : Outcome context-dependence is not WEIRD: Comparing reinforcement- and description-based economic preferences worldwide
Thursday 10 November 2022 10:00-11:00
HUANG Yuchen (PSE) : Meritocracy for the Meritocrats: an Experiment on the Cultural Interpretation of Meritocracy
ZHEXUN MO Fred (PSE)
BELGUISE Margot (Warwick)
Thursday 13 October 2022 10:00-11:00
DEKEL Amit (PSE) : Testing myopic and farsighted stability concepts: a network formation experiment
Thursday 15 September 2022 10:00-11:00
STAROPOLI Carine (PSE) : Impact des tarifs sur les choix de mode de transport
Thursday 23 June 2022 10:00-10:45
WEBB Duncan (PSE) : Laws, Norms, and Discrimination: Gay Rights in India
Friday 15 April 2022 11:00-12:00
MSE
KORDA Hélène : *
Friday 18 March 2022 11:00-12:00
MSE (114)
SAUCET Charlotte : *
Thursday 24 February 2022 10:00-11:00
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan
HUANG Yuchen (PSE) : *
Thursday 17 February 2022 10:00-11:00
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan
CHAVEZ Emmanuel (PSE) : *
Friday 4 February 2022 11:00-12:00
MSE (114)
HENRY Emeric : Moral behavior: a tale of two images
JACQUEMET Nicolas
GALBIATI Roberto (Sciences Po)
Friday 21 January 2022 11:00-12:00
MSE (114)
SCARELLI Thiago (PSE) : Financial Concerns and Labor Income Discounting
Thursday 24 June 2021 11:00-12:00
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : Redistributive Preferences when Inequality is an Externality
Morten Nyborg Stostad
Thursday 27 May 2021 11:00-12:00
ZAPPALÀ Guglielmo (PSE) : Drought exposure and accuracy: Motivated reasoning in climate change beliefs
Abstract
Despite scientific consensus, there is no unanimity among citizens in the beliefs about climate change. Understanding how people form beliefs about climate change and what drives their interpretation of climatic events is essential, especially in developing countries and among agricultural communities, who may most suffer from climate change consequences. Using survey data from rural households in Bangladesh matched with objective drought data, this paper studies how long-term average drought exposure and short-term deviations shape belief formation and accuracy in recollecting past drought events. In order to further investigate how agents interpret these past drought events, I use an instrumental variable approach to test and validate that individuals are subject to confirmation bias. The results show that the probability of overestimating the number of past drought events and the intensity with which individuals overestimate are significantly biased in the direction of their prior beliefs. The findings highlight the need of models that account for behavioral factors such as confirmation bias and motivated reasoning to study climate change preference formation, and its implications for effective communication.
Thursday 29 April 2021 11:00-12:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/92401995708?pwd=SjU2ZnNWYzh0QnhuNXI4eG56ZXpEZz09
SALAMANCA Andrés (PSE) : Values of games without transferable utility: An experimental approach
Thursday 25 March 2021 11:30-12:30
CHARROIN Liza (Université Paris 1) : Rumors diffusion in the lab
Francis Bloch (PSE) and Sudipta Sarangi (Virginia Tech)
Thursday 11 March 2021 11:00-12:00
MUN Sofiia (CES, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) : Deliberate Randomization and Ambiguity: Is There a Connection?
Elias Bouacida (Lancaster University, Management School)
Thursday 17 December 2020 11:00-12:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/91585525960?pwd=b0Evc2l2VlpuKzJiV1J6T2FSVTRDZz09
TZINTZUN Iván (PSE) : The Causal Effect of Physical Activity on Health in Early Adulthood: A Gene By Environment Instrumental Variables Approach
Lise Rochaix
Thursday 26 November 2020 11:00-12:00
Zoom TBA
COMOLA Margherita (PSE) : Bidding on Links: Experimental Evidence on Multi-object Auctions
Friday 13 November 2020 11:00-12:00
On line
COMOLA Margherita (PSE) : TBA
CHARROIN Liza (Université Paris 1) : TBA
Friday 13 November 2020 11:00-12:00
CHARROIN Liza (Université Paris 1) : Anticonformism: An experiment with matching pennies
Béatrice Boulu-Reshef and Agnieszka Rusinowska
Wednesday 29 April 2020 15:00-16:00
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : Motivated Beliefs and Preferences for Redistribution
Thursday 19 March 2020 11:00-12:00
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : Motivated Beliefs and Preferences for Redistribution (canceled)
Friday 28 February 2020 11:00-11:45
MSE, Room B2-1
RACHIDI Tobias (PSE) : Double-sided opportunism in infrastructure investment
Béatrice Boulu-Reshef and Marian Moszoro
Thursday 30 January 2020 10:30-11:30
R2-20
MUN Soffia (PSE) : Econometric estimation of Prospect Theory for Natural Ambiguity
Friday 29 November 2019 11:00-12:00
MSE Salle S/1
MIKEL Hualde (University of Navarre) : On the aversion to incomplete preferences. An axiomatic approach
Thursday 23 May 2019 10:00-10:45
Jourdan, R2-20
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : Principals' Distributive Preferences and the Incentivization of Agents
Thursday 21 March 2019 10:00-10:45
Jourdan R1-14
MUN Soffia (PSE) : Risk and Ambiguity Preferences: Attitudes of the Self and Beliefs About Others
Thursday 21 February 2019 10:00-10:45
PALMINTERI Stefano (ENS) : Learning to speculate: A neuroeconomics approach (R1-13)
BASILE Garcia (ENS)
Thursday 20 December 2018 10:00-10:45
Jourdan, R1-11
JACQUEL Pierre (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES) : The impact of overconfidence on information cascade: A new experimental approach
Thursday 15 November 2018 10:00-10:45
COMPTE Olivier (PSE) : A war game
Friday 26 October 2018 10:00-10:45
MSE S/18
WANG Olivier (NYU Stern) : Information curse in financial forecasting
Thursday 27 September 2018 11:00-11:45
Jourdan: R1-14
COMOLA Margherita (PSE) : Social and economic inequality
MERLINO Luca Paolo (Antwerpen University)
Thursday 17 May 2018 10:00-11:00
R2-20
CETRE Sophie (PSE - Sciences Po) : Do incentives conflict with fairness
Thursday 12 April 2018 10:00-11:00
Campus Jourdan, R1-16
HEMON Antoine : Should We Take Experimental Recommendations at Face Value ? Social Image Motivation & Self-Sorting in a Public-Good Experiment
Thursday 29 March 2018 10:00-11:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SINGH Juni : Social proximity and the choice of monitors: A lab in the field experiment in Nepal
GIULIO Iacobelli (PSE)
Thursday 8 February 2018 10:00-11:00
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : An experimental study on the link between anti-social preferences and within firm mobility
Thursday 18 January 2018 10:00-11:00
BOUACIDA Elias (PSE) : Pay-for-certainty, an experiment to elicit (in)complete preferences
Thursday 14 December 2017 10:00-11:00
salle R1-10, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
LASLIER Jean-François (CNRS-PSE) : The shooter anxiety at the penalty kick
ARRONDEL Luc (PSE)
DUHAUTOIS Richard (CNAM)
Thursday 30 November 2017 11:30-12:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
COMOLA Margherita (PSE) : An experiment on strategic targeting in networks
RUSINOWSKA Agnieszka (Paris 1)
VILLEVAL Marie Claire (CNRS - University of Lyon)
Thursday 12 October 2017 10:00-11:00
R1-15
ETILÉ Fabrice (PSE) : Personal Identity and Preferences: Empirical extensions
YIN Rémi (PSE)
Thursday 21 September 2017 09:30-10:30
Test
Friday 1 September 2017
Behavior Working Group
Abstract
This paper analyzes the incentives that arise within an organization when communication is restricted to a particular network structure (e.g., a hierarchy). We show that restricting communication between the principal and agents may create incentives for the agents to misbehave when transmitting information and tasks throughout the organization. Such incentives can render the principal's most preferred outcome infeasible and therefore introduces a trade off between the cost of communication borne by the principal and the benefit of curbing incentives to deviate induced by the communication structure. To remedy this issue, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the topology of the network of communication such that restricting communication to a particular network does not restrict the set of outcomes that the principal could otherwise achieve. In this sense, we show that for any underlying incentives and any outcome available when communication is unrestricted, there exists a (finite) communication scheme restricted to a particular network that implements this outcome (i.e., does not induce agents to misbehave in the communication phase) if and only if that network satisfies our conditions.
Friday 23 June 2017 10:00-10:45
MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle du 6ème étage) 75013 Paris
"Evaluating average confidence (psychology) towards a bargaining task (economics)"
Thursday 1 June 2017 11:00-11:45
DORIN Camille : Socio-economic status and redistribution behavior: an experiment
Thursday 27 April 2017 11:00-11:45
An experimental approach to preventive behavior
Thursday 23 March 2017 11:00-11:45
Room R1-14, Jourdan
ETILÉ Fabrice (PSE) : Personal Identity and Preferences: measurement issues and lab experiment
YIN Rémi (PSE)
Friday 3 February 2017 10:00-10:45
Room 115, Maison des Sciences Economiques
BOULU-RESHEF Béatrice : Towards the management of donors: Experiments in the lab and in the field on charitable donations to a Arts firm
Thursday 1 December 2016 11:00-11:45
A2 room, Jourdan
SENIK Claudia : Choice experiments to elicit inequality aversion
Friday 25 November 2016 10:00-10:45
B2.1 room, Maison des Sciences Economiques
HEMON Antoine : Social Image Motivation or Social Image Constraint ? Voluntary Participation in Public Good Experiments
Thursday 13 October 2016 10:45-11:45
DSS room, Building B, 2nd floor, Jourdan
BOUACIDA Elias (PSE) : Indifference or Indecision: an Experiment using Choice Correspondences
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MSE Salle 115
VARDAXOGLOU Laurence (PSE) : Effect of misinformation on voting in the laboratory
SAVEY Lily
Abstract
For health-related matters, being misinformed leads individuals to make bad decisions. In politics, it is less obvious. Although misinformation has been shown to influence voting decisions, this is not necessarily a deviation from rational voting. An individual might indeed be tricked into a non-rational voting decision, or motivated to opt for the candidate who maximises the utility of their vote. Our aim is to explore the extent to which different kinds of misinformation obstruct rational voting. We propose to study rational voting in the laboratory, as it allows us to control for important factors that are inevitably imprecisely measured using survey data.
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B2.1 room, Maison des Sciences Economiques
HEMON Antoine : Social Image Motivation or Social Image Constraint ? Voluntary Participation in Public Good Experiments