Workshop « Central clearing and market infrastructures: new challenges » | June 5-6
Paris School of Economics and the ANR FIRR are pleased to invite you to the last Workshop on “Central clearing and market infrastructures: new challenges”.
- Date: 5-6 June 2023,
- Location: Paris School of Economics
48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris, room R2-21 (2nd floor) - Organizers: Gabrielle Demange (PSE-EHESS), Thibaut Piquard (Banque de France) and Guillaume Vuillemet (HEC Paris)
Registration link (compulsory)
Program
Day 1 - June 5
10:30 - 10:55 - Welcome coffee
10:55 - 11:00 - Introduction
11:00 - 12:20 - Session 1
Norman Schürhoff, All-to-all liquidity in corporate bonds, university of Lausanne
Agostino Capponi, The collateral rule: evidence from the credit default swap market, Columbia university
12:20 - 13:45 - Lunch
13:45 - 15:45 - Session 2
Hugues Dastarac, Imperfert competition and the financialization of commodities future markets (Banque de France)
Laurence Daures, Client heterogeneity and bilateral oligopoly in credit derivative markets (ESSEC)
Thibaut Piquard, Credit default swaps and credit risk reallocation (Banque de France)
15:45 - 16:15 - Coffee break
16:15 - 17:45 - Practitioners’ and policy panel 1 - Energy, metals, non-banks: what new risks for CCPs?
Moderator: Guillaume Vuillemey (HEC)
Teo Floor (CPP12)
Klaus Löber (ESMA CCP Supervisory Commitee)
19:30 - Conference dinner (for presenters and coauthors only)
Day 2 - June 6
8:30 - 9:00 - Welcome coffee
9:00 - 11:00 - Session 4
Evangelo Benos, Collateral cycles (university of Nottingham)
Tobias Dieler, (In)efficient repo markets(Bristol university)
Wenqian Huang, DeFi lending and repo market design (BIS)
11:00 - 11:30 - Coffee break
11:30-13:00 - Practitioners’ and policy panel 2 - Geopolitics and competition: a new landscapte for CPPs
Moderator: Jean-Edouard Colliard (HEC)
Rafael Plata (EACH - European association of CCPs)
Julien Jardelot (LSEG)
13:00 - 14:00 - Lunch
14:00 - 16:00 - Session 6
Dmitry Chebotarev, The paradox of conservative haircuts (Indiana university)
Iñaki Aldasoro, Systemic risk in markets with multiple central counterparties
Rama Cont, Skin in the game: risk analysis of central counterparties (Oxford university)
