Economics serving society

Workshop on “Advances in Mechanism Design”, July 12-13

Workshop on “Advances in Mechanism Design”

July 12–13, 2012
Paris School of Economics
48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France

Organizer: Olivier Tercieux (Paris School of Economics – CNRS)
If you wish to attend, please send a mail to lelievre
before June 22. Please specify if you would like to attend the lunch on
July, 12 and July, 13 (subject to limitation)

Thursday, July 12
10:00 - 10:45: Tilman Borgers (Michigan U): “Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules”
10:45 - 11:30: Takuro Yamashita (TSE): “A robustly revenue maximizing auction in admissible strategies”
11:45 - 12:30: Andy Postlewaite (U Penn): “Matching with Incomplete Information”
14:00 - 14:45: Onur Kesten (Carnergie Mellon U): “From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a family of assignment mechanisms”
14:45 - 15:30: Fuhito Kojima (Stanford): “Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach”
16:00 - 16:45: Lucie Ménager (Paris 2): “Communication in procurement”
16:45 - 17:30: Laurent Lamy (PSE): “Equilibria in two-stage sequential second-price auctions with multi-unit demands”

Friday, July 13
09:15 - 10:00: Yi-Chun Chen (National University of Singapore): “Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction”
10:00 - 10:45: Alia Gizatulina (Max Planck Institute — Bonn): “On Designer’ Uncertainty and Robustness of the BDP Property”
11:00 - 11:45: Guillaume Haeringer (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona): “Two-Sided Matching with One-Sided Preferences”
11:45 - 12:30: Nicole Immorlica (Northwestern): “On the Limits of Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design”