Seminars

PSE internal seminar

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Upcoming events

• Friday 17 February 2023 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  BALLESTER Miguel (Oxford University) : TBA

  APOUEY Bénédicte (PSE, CNRS) : TBA

• Friday 31 March 2023 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  BOZIO Antoine (PSE, EHESS) : TBA

  LAMBERT Sylvie (PSE, INRAE) : TBA

Archives

• Friday 16 December 2022 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  DURANTE Ruben (BSE) : Media Capture by Banks

  VANDEN EYNDE Oliver (PSE, CNRS) : Cooperation between National Armies: Evidence from the border regions in the Sahel

  Abstract

  with Andrea Fabiani, Luc Laeven, José-Luis Peydró Do banks exploit lending relationships with media companies to promote favorable news coverage? To test this hypothesis we map the connections between banks and the top newspapers in several European countries and study how they affect news coverage of two important financial issues. First we look at bank earnings announcements and find that newspapers are significantly more likely to cover announcements by their lenders, relative to other banks, when they report profits than when they report losses. Such pro-lender bias applies to both general-interest and financial newspapers, and is stronger for newspapers and banks that are more financially vulnerable. Second, we look at a broader public interest issue: the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis. We find that newspapers connected to banks more exposed to stressed sovereign bonds are more likely to promote a narrative of the crisis favorable to banks and to oppose debt-restructuring measures detrimental to creditors.

• Friday 25 November 2022 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  DISDIER Anne-Célia (PSE, INRAE) : Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds

  DIETRICH Franz (PSE, CNRS) : International diffusion of food innovations and nutrition transition

  Abstract

  Co-author: K. Spiekermann (LSE) Does pre-voting group deliberation increase majority competence? To address this question, we develop a non-game-theoretic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is beneficial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Simulations and theoretic arguments confirm this. But there are five systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always through increasing Failure 1. Our analysis recommends deliberation that is ‘participatory', ‘even', but possibly ‘unequal', i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but possibly privileges some persons.

  Full text [pdf]

• Friday 14 October 2022 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  RICKNE Johanna (Stockholm University) : *

  JEHIEL Philippe (PSE, ENCP)

• Friday 30 September 2022 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  PIGUILLEM Facundo (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance) : Government Debt, Capital Taxation and Redistribution

  FRIEDMAN Evan (PSE) : Stochastic Choice in Games

  Kirill Shakhnov (University of Surrey)

• Friday 15 April 2022 12:30-13:30

  R2-21

  ETILÉ Fabrice (PSE) : *

  KOESSLER Frédéric (PSE)

• Friday 25 March 2022 12:30-13:30

  R1-09

  MACÉ Antonin (PSE) : Voting in Shareholders Meetings

  BREDA Thomas (PSE) : Under-Reporting of Firm Size Around Size-Dependent Regulation Thresholds: Evidence from France

  Abstract

  This paper studies the informational efficiency of voting mechanisms in shareholder meetings. When the management does not affect the proposal being voted on, we show that voting mechanisms are more efficient when their ballot space is richer. Moreover, efficiency requires full divisibility of the votes. When the management has agenda power, we uncover a novel trade-off?: more efficient mechanisms provide worse incentives to select good proposals. This negative effect can be large enough to wash out the higher voting efficiency of even the most efficient mechanisms.

  Full text [pdf]

• Friday 11 February 2022 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  LEBRETON Maël (PSE) : Incentive motivation differently affects beliefs and confidence judgments.

  CASELLA Alessandra : Two Lab Experiments on Alternative Voting Rules: Cumulative Voting and Liquid Democracy

  Abstract

  Alessandra Casella (co-authors: Joseph Campbell, Lucas de Lara, Jeffrey Guo, Michelle Jiang, Victoria Mooers, & Dilip Ravindran): US courts have used Cumulative Voting (CV) to remedy violations of the Voting Rights Acts and increase minority representation. Under CV, each voter has as many votes as open positions but can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Although each voter is treated equally, theory predicts that CV increases both minority’s turnout relative to the majority, and the minority’s share of seats won. Liquid Democracy (LD) is celebrated by supporters as the golden medium between direct and representative democracy. Under LD, decisions are taken by referendum, but voters are allowed to delegate their votes. When experts are correctly identified, theory shows that the outcome can be superior to simple majority voting. In the lab, CV's theoretical promise is satisfied: the minority's turnout and its share of seats both increases. LD, however, falls short of its potential: systematic over-delegation leads to its underperformance relative to simple majority. Maël Lebreton (co-authors: Nahuel Salem-Garcia & Sébastien Massoni): Countless reports of over-optimism, overconfidence, wishful-thinking and desirability biases suggest that a general motivated-cognition bias distort all beliefs uniformly. Here, we provide evidence against this view, and demonstrate that motivational biases differentially affect proper beliefs, i.e. probability judgments over (external) states, and confidence judgements, i.e. probability judgments over ones’ own actions or statements being correct. Across multiple experiments, we systematically manipulate the agency of decisions over ambiguous states-of-the-world and the valence of monetary incentives for accurate probabilistic judgments about the correctness of those decisions. We identify a clear effect of the net incentive value on confidence, which vanishes when considering beliefs. These results, which falsify the most general interpretations of motivated-belief theories, suggest that beliefs and confidence stem from fundamentally different cognitive mechanisms. Consequently, although similarly ubiquitous and apparently related, overconfidence and (over)optimism biases might have different causes and remedies.

• Friday 17 December 2021 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  D ALBIS Hippolyte (PSE) : Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Double Coincidence of Wants without Money

  TERCIEUX Olivier (PSE) : Global Uncertainty and International Migration to Western Europe

  Abstract

  Co-authors: Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford University), Julien Combe (CREST), Yinghua He (Rice University), Victor Hiller (Paris 2), Robert Shimer (University of Chicago). For an incompatible patient-donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. Our proposal, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, uses “memory” as a medium of exchange to eliminate these timing constraints. In a dynamic matching model, we prove that Unpaired delivers a waiting time of patients close to optimal and substantially shorter than currently utilized state-of-the-art algorithms. Using a rich administrative dataset from France, we show that Unpaired achieves a match rate of 57 percent and an average waiting time of 440 days. The (infeasible) optimal algorithm is only slightly better (58 percent and 425 days); state-of-the-art algorithms deliver less than 34 percent and more than 695 days. We draw similar conclusions from the simulations of two large U.S. platforms. Lastly, we propose a range of solutions that can address the potential practical concerns of Unpaired.

• Friday 26 November 2021 12:30-14:00

  R2-01

  WREN-LEWIS Liam (PSE) : Complementarities in Infrastructure: Evidence from Rural India

  OLLIVIER Hélène (PSE) : Estimating the Effects of Incomplete Regulation on Regulated Firms and their Competitors: An Application to the EU ETS

  Abstract

  Co-author: Oliver Vanden Eynde (PSE) Complementarities between infrastructure projects have been understudied. Our paper examines interactions in the impacts of large-scale road construction, electrification, and mobile phone coverage programs in rural India. We find strong evidence of complementary impacts between roads and electricity on agricultural production: dry season cropping increases significantly when villages receive both, but not when they receive one without the other. These complementarities are associated with a shift of cropping patterns towards market crops and with improved economic conditions. In contrast, we find no consistent evidence of complementarities for the mobile coverage program.

• Friday 22 October 2021 12:30-14:00

  R2-01

  STEWART Colin (University of Toronto) : Attention Please!

  STANCANELLI Elena (PSE) : A tale of hours worked for pay from home before and after the Great Recession: learning from high-frequency diaries

  .

  Abstract

  We study the impact of manipulating the attention of a decision-maker who learns sequentially about a number of items before making a choice. Under natural assumptions on the decision-maker’s strategy, directing attention toward one item increases its likelihood of being chosen regardless of its value. This result applies when the decisionmaker can reject all items in favor of an outside option with known value; if no outside option is available, the direction of the effect of manipulation depends on the value of the item. A similar result applies to manipulation of choices in bandit problems. http://individual.utoronto.ca/colinstewart/ap.pdf

• Friday 28 May 2021 13:45-15:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Friday 28 May 2021 13:15-13:45

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Friday 16 April 2021 13:45-15:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Friday 16 April 2021 13:15-13:45

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Friday 26 March 2021 13:45-15:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Friday 26 March 2021 13:15-13:45

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Friday 12 February 2021 13:45-15:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Friday 18 December 2020 13:46-14:15

  online

  OH Susanna (PSE) : Gender Norms in Marriage and Female Labor Productivity

  Abstract

  This project investigates whether gender norms lead women to hold back their potential in the labor market. While the existing literature has shown that women tend to earn less than their husbands, there is limited direct evidence on whether women actively avoid earning more than their spouses and the determinants of such behavior. The experiment engages married couples working as casual laborers in a short-term manufacturing job that pays piece-rate on output. The experiment provides women an extra hour to work without this difference being salient, making it likely that they could earn more than their husbands. After husbands finish piece-rate production, women are randomized into one of three conditions in which 1) wife is informed of her husband’s production and expects both spouses to learn the couple’s individual production at the end of the day, 2) wife is informed of her husband’s production and expects that only she will learn the couple’s individual production, or 3) both spouses are only informed of their joint production. Pilot results show that women in the last two conditions achieve on average one hour’s worth of production more than that of their husbands, suggesting that women do not have intrinsic concerns about earning more than their husbands. However, this productivity gap disappears when women expect their husbands to also find out about individual production, suggesting that women care about husbands’ beliefs or reactions.

• Friday 18 December 2020 13:15-13:40

  online

  VELLODI Nikhil (PSE) : Insider Imitation and Privacy on Platforms (co-author: Erik Madsen (NYU)

• Friday 27 November 2020 13:45-15:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  FLEURBAEY MARC : *

• Friday 27 November 2020 12:00-15:00

  LASLIER Jean-François (CNRS-PSE) : JOINT EVENT with PSE collaborative project “Economie et Philosophie” : The French Citizens' Convention on Climate: A forerunner to future democracy?

  APOUEY Bénédicte (PSE, CNRS)

  FLEURBAEY Marc (PSE)

  DRYZEK John (University of Canberra)

  FUNG Archon (Harvard)

  GIRARD Charles (Université Jean Moulin - Lyon)

  LANDEMORE Hélène (Yale )

  ROUSSIN Juliette (Université de Laval - Québec)

  Abstract

  The Paris School of Economics is organising a workshop on the French Citizen Convention on Climate. A presentation will be made by researchers who have observed the whole process of this citizen assembly that started in October 2019. Then a panel discussion will be offered by specialists of deliberative democracy and political philosophy. Are such citizen participatory schemes a political sideshow or a key component of an ideal deliberative democracy? Programm: 12h-13h: Presentation of the Convention, by Bénédicte Apouey and Jean-François Laslier (CNRS-PSE) 13h-15h: Panel discussion with John Dryzek (University of Canberra) , Archon Fung (Harvard Kennedy School), Charles Girard (Université Jean Moulin de Lyon), Hélène Landemore (Yale University) and Juliette Roussin (Université Laval à Québec), moderated by Marc Fleurbaey (CNRS-PSE and ENS-CERES).

• Thursday 25 June 2020 12:00-13:30

  ZOOM

  MILCENT Carine (PSE) : *

  COIMBRA Nuno (PSE)

• Thursday 28 May 2020 12:30-14:30

  *

• Thursday 30 April 2020 14:00-15:30

  ZOOM

  FERRIÈRE Axelle (PSE) : Escaping the Losses from Trade: The Impact of Heterogeneity on Skill Acquisition

  KETZ Philipp (PSE)

  G. Navarro and R.Reyes-Heroles

  Abstract

  Future generations of workers can invest in education, acquire skill and avoid the negative consequences of trade openness for low-skilled workers. However, not all members of these future generations might have the resources required to make such investments. In this paper we exploit variation in exposure to import penetration shocks across space in the United States to show that greater import penetration increases college enrollment and that this increase is driven by future workers in richer households. To analyze the welfare implications of the effects of trade openness on college enrollment, we propose a dynamic multi-region model of international trade with heterogeneous agents. The model features incomplete credit markets and costly endogenous skill acquisition. We calibrate the model to match changes in aggregate trade data for the United States and differential import exposure across U.S. regions. Lower import barriers generate increased college enrollment and welfare gains for all workers in the long-run. However, these gains are concentrated on workers with a college education, whose welfare gains are twice as large as those of non-college workers. While all workers in the manufacturing sector lose from grater trade openness, a small number of college educated workers in manufacturing with low wealth experience the greatest losses. Increasing college enrollment for new cohorts over time plays a crucial role in allowing new generations of workers to escape the potential welfare losses form trade. However, poor dynasties take the longest to acquire skills. They are therefore the last to experience positive gains from trade openness, and entire generations may not realize any gains within a life-time.

• Thursday 26 March 2020 12:30-14:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Thursday 27 February 2020 12:30-14:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Thursday 12 December 2019 12:30-14:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  LAMBERT-MOGILIANSKY Ariane (PSE) : *

  BEZIN Emeline

• Thursday 28 November 2019 12:00-13:30

  KU Hyejin (UCL) : *

  ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina (PSE)

• Thursday 17 October 2019 12:00-13:30

  salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  Social and economic inequality

  Abstract

  We present the preliminary results from a lab experiment investigating how economic inequality and network structure affect public good provision. We frame the experiment as a local public good game: in the lab, subjects are assigned a network position, and an endowment to be split between a private good and a public good that benefits direct neighbors as well. Our aim is to test the behavioral validity of the equilibrium predictions, and whether subjects are able to coordinate away from equilibrium to maximize welfare.

• Thursday 26 September 2019 12:00-13:30

  R2.02

  TBA

  TBA

  Abstract

  TBA

  Full text [pdf]

• Thursday 26 September 2019 12:00-13:30

  TBA

• Thursday 26 September 2019 12:00-13:30

  *

• Thursday 26 September 2019 12:00-13:30

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Thursday 26 September 2019 12:00-13:30

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  VERDIER Thierry (PSE) : From preferences to representation

  LASLIER Jean-François (CNRS-PSE) : Samaritan Bundles: Fundraising Competition and Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects (joint with Gani Aldashev and Marco Marini)

  test

  Abstract

  I will introduce and analyse some ideas that have been proposed in order to give a positive answer to the question: Is it possible to achieve proportional representation while voting for individual candidates rather than for parties?

  Full text [pdf]