Seminars

PSE internal seminar

Internal monthly meeting allowing PSE searchers and PhD students to present their on-going work.

Organizers: Claudia Senik & Olivier Tercieux
Operational contact: Sophie Gozlan – sophie.gozlan psemail.eu

This seminar is co-funded by a French government subsidy managed by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche under the framework of the Investissements d’avenir programme reference ANR-17-EURE-0001.

Upcoming events

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Archives

Friday 22 October 2021 12:30-14:00
R2-01
STEWART Colin (University of Toronto) : Attention Please!
STANCANELLI Elena (PSE) : A tale of hours worked for pay from home before and after the Great Recession: learning from high-frequency diaries
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Abstract
We study the impact of manipulating the attention of a decision-maker who learns sequentially about a number of items before making a choice. Under natural assumptions on the decision-maker’s strategy, directing attention toward one item increases its likelihood of being chosen regardless of its value. This result applies when the decisionmaker can reject all items in favor of an outside option with known value; if no outside option is available, the direction of the effect of manipulation depends on the value of the item. A similar result applies to manipulation of choices in bandit problems. http://individual.utoronto.ca/colinstewart/ap.pdf
Friday 28 May 2021 13:45-15:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
*
Friday 28 May 2021 13:15-13:45
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
*
Friday 16 April 2021 13:45-15:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
*
Friday 16 April 2021 13:15-13:45
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
*
Friday 26 March 2021 13:45-15:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
*
Friday 26 March 2021 13:15-13:45
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
*
Friday 12 February 2021 13:45-15:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
*
Friday 18 December 2020 13:46-14:15
online
OH Susanna (PSE) : Gender Norms in Marriage and Female Labor Productivity
Abstract
This project investigates whether gender norms lead women to hold back their potential in the labor market. While the existing literature has shown that women tend to earn less than their husbands, there is limited direct evidence on whether women actively avoid earning more than their spouses and the determinants of such behavior. The experiment engages married couples working as casual laborers in a short-term manufacturing job that pays piece-rate on output. The experiment provides women an extra hour to work without this difference being salient, making it likely that they could earn more than their husbands. After husbands finish piece-rate production, women are randomized into one of three conditions in which 1) wife is informed of her husband’s production and expects both spouses to learn the couple’s individual production at the end of the day, 2) wife is informed of her husband’s production and expects that only she will learn the couple’s individual production, or 3) both spouses are only informed of their joint production. Pilot results show that women in the last two conditions achieve on average one hour’s worth of production more than that of their husbands, suggesting that women do not have intrinsic concerns about earning more than their husbands. However, this productivity gap disappears when women expect their husbands to also find out about individual production, suggesting that women care about husbands’ beliefs or reactions.
Friday 18 December 2020 13:15-13:40
online
VELLODI Nikhil (PSE) : Insider Imitation and Privacy on Platforms (co-author: Erik Madsen (NYU)
Friday 27 November 2020 13:45-15:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
FLEURBAEY MARC : *
Friday 27 November 2020 12:00-15:00
LASLIER Jean-François (CNRS-PSE) : JOINT EVENT with PSE collaborative project “Economie et Philosophie” : The French Citizens' Convention on Climate: A forerunner to future democracy?
APOUEY Bénédicte (CNRS-PSE)
FLEURBAEY Marc (CNRS-PSE and ENS-CERES)
DRYZEK John (University of Canberra)
FUNG Archon (Harvard)
GIRARD Charles (Université Jean Moulin - Lyon)
LANDEMORE Hélène (Yale )
ROUSSIN Juliette (Université de Laval - Québec)
Abstract
The Paris School of Economics is organising a workshop on the French Citizen Convention on Climate. A presentation will be made by researchers who have observed the whole process of this citizen assembly that started in October 2019. Then a panel discussion will be offered by specialists of deliberative democracy and political philosophy. Are such citizen participatory schemes a political sideshow or a key component of an ideal deliberative democracy? Programm: 12h-13h: Presentation of the Convention, by Bénédicte Apouey and Jean-François Laslier (CNRS-PSE) 13h-15h: Panel discussion with John Dryzek (University of Canberra) , Archon Fung (Harvard Kennedy School), Charles Girard (Université Jean Moulin de Lyon), Hélène Landemore (Yale University) and Juliette Roussin (Université Laval à Québec), moderated by Marc Fleurbaey (CNRS-PSE and ENS-CERES).
Thursday 25 June 2020 12:00-13:30
ZOOM
MILCENT Carine (PSE) : *
COIMBRA Nuno (PSE)
Thursday 28 May 2020 12:30-14:30
*
Thursday 30 April 2020 14:00-15:30
ZOOM
FERRIÈRE Axelle (PSE) : Escaping the Losses from Trade: The Impact of Heterogeneity on Skill Acquisition
KETZ Philipp (PSE)
G. Navarro and R.Reyes-Heroles
Abstract
Future generations of workers can invest in education, acquire skill and avoid the negative consequences of trade openness for low-skilled workers. However, not all members of these future generations might have the resources required to make such investments. In this paper we exploit variation in exposure to import penetration shocks across space in the United States to show that greater import penetration increases college enrollment and that this increase is driven by future workers in richer households. To analyze the welfare implications of the effects of trade openness on college enrollment, we propose a dynamic multi-region model of international trade with heterogeneous agents. The model features incomplete credit markets and costly endogenous skill acquisition. We calibrate the model to match changes in aggregate trade data for the United States and differential import exposure across U.S. regions. Lower import barriers generate increased college enrollment and welfare gains for all workers in the long-run. However, these gains are concentrated on workers with a college education, whose welfare gains are twice as large as those of non-college workers. While all workers in the manufacturing sector lose from grater trade openness, a small number of college educated workers in manufacturing with low wealth experience the greatest losses. Increasing college enrollment for new cohorts over time plays a crucial role in allowing new generations of workers to escape the potential welfare losses form trade. However, poor dynasties take the longest to acquire skills. They are therefore the last to experience positive gains from trade openness, and entire generations may not realize any gains within a life-time.
Thursday 26 March 2020 12:30-14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
*
Thursday 27 February 2020 12:30-14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
*
Thursday 12 December 2019 12:30-14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
LAMBERT-MOGILIANSKY Ariane : *
BEZIN Emeline
Thursday 28 November 2019 12:00-13:30
RAPOPORT Hillel (PSE) : *
ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina (PSE)
Thursday 17 October 2019 12:00-13:30
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
Social and economic inequality
Abstract
We present the preliminary results from a lab experiment investigating how economic inequality and network structure affect public good provision. We frame the experiment as a local public good game: in the lab, subjects are assigned a network position, and an endowment to be split between a private good and a public good that benefits direct neighbors as well. Our aim is to test the behavioral validity of the equilibrium predictions, and whether subjects are able to coordinate away from equilibrium to maximize welfare.
Thursday 26 September 2019 12:00-13:30
R2.02
TBA
TBA
Abstract
TBA
Full text [pdf]
Thursday 26 September 2019 12:00-13:30
TBA
Thursday 26 September 2019 12:00-13:30
*
Thursday 26 September 2019 12:00-13:30
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
*
Thursday 26 September 2019 12:00-13:30
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
VERDIER Thierry (PSE) : From preferences to representation
LASLIER Jean-François (CNRS-PSE) : Samaritan Bundles: Fundraising Competition and Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects (joint with Gani Aldashev and Marco Marini)
test
Abstract
I will introduce and analyse some ideas that have been proposed in order to give a positive answer to the question: Is it possible to achieve proportional representation while voting for individual candidates rather than for parties?
Full text [pdf]