Who are the professors?
Program Director: Philippe Gagnepain is Chaired Professor at PSE and Professor at Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. His research focuses on empirical industrial organization with particular attention to issues of competition and regulation in network industries. The empirical framework is generally constructed around tools suggested by the new theory of regulation and/or uses the concepts of equilibrium offered by game theory and industrial organization.
- Class taught during the programme: Platform antitrust: Empirical tests
- Webpage: http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/en/gagnepain-philippe/
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Francis Bloch is a Professor at PSE and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. His research interests are coalition and network theory, with applications in Industrial Organization, Public and Development Economics. His research has been published in American Economic Review, Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, and he is currently an Associate Editor of Econometrica, Economics Letters, Games and Economic Behavior and Journal of Public Economic Theory.
- Class taught during the programme: Platforms: Business models and information
- Webpage: https://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/en/bloch-francis/
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Régis Renault is Professor of Economics at the University of Cergy-Pontoise. His research in industrial organization has mostly focused on consumer search and advertising. He has coauthored with Simon Anderson an article on imperfect competition with consumer search, published in the Rand Journal of Economics, which has become very influential in the analysis of online search.
- Class taught during the programme: Search: Platform design
- Webpage: https://sites.google.com/site/homepageofregisrenault/
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Nikhil Vellodi is Assistant Professor at PSE. His recent research focuses on the impact of consumer reviews on the incentives for firms to participate in the market through the lens of ratings design. He shows that suppressing the reviews of highly-rated firms makes the task of climbing the ratings ladder less arduous, thus stimulating participation and consumer welfare.
- Class taught during the programme: Platforms and Data
- Webpage: https://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/en/vellodi-nikhil/
Contents – Industrial Organization