Elena del Mercato
Professeur à PSE
Maître de Conférences Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Associate Researcher CSEF
Campus Jourdan – Maison des Sciences Economiques 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital 75647 Paris Cedex 13
Bâtiment CES, 5e étage, bureau 518
Tél. 01 44 07 83 03
- Théorie des jeux
- Équilibre général
- Economie mathématiques
Licence L3 MIASHS - in French
This course is based on the classic paradigm of general equilibrium models and the concepts of competitive equilibrium and social welfare associated with these models. It is well known that the existence of competitive equilibria and the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics are based on highly restrictive assumptions of full transaction, complete information, absence of money, absence of public goods and absence of interactions among agents. For that reason, the classical model has been modified considering these different kinds of “imperfections”. One of the topics of this course concerns externalities, that is situations where agents' decisions affect the choices of the others. In the context of general equilibrium models, the natural adaptation of the concept of competitive equilibrium leads to a concept of equilibrium à la Nash. As in the classical case, equilibrium prices reflect the individual marginal effects. But, welfare conditions à la Pareto reflect the social marginal effects. So, in general, the presence of externalities leads to sub-optimal equilibrium allocations. Several possibilities are open to recover the Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocations.
Masters M1 IMMAEF, MAEF, and QEM1 - in English
This course deals with individual decision making by consumers and producers.
Masters M2 MMMEF and APE - in English
The general economic equilibrium theory studies the interactions among heterogeneous agents on commodity and financial markets. The course focuses on the classical Arrow-Debreu model and the main properties of a competitive equilibrium (existence, efficiency, local uniqueness, structure of the equilibrium set). The course is a necessary step to handle advanced questions arising from financial markets and markets imperfections, such as externalities, imperfect competition or increasing returns to scale.