Séminaires

Groupe de travail Comportement

• Prochainement
• Archives

Prochainement

• Jeudi 14 décembre 2023 10:00-11:00

  R1-14

  LAGO RODRÍGUEZ Manuel Estevo : *

Archives

• Vendredi 17 novembre 2023 10:00-11:00

  SALLE 115 , MSE

  VARDAXOGLOU Laurence : Effect of misinformation on voting in the laboratory

  SAVEY Lily

  Résumé

  For health-related matters, being misinformed leads individuals to make bad decisions. In politics, it is less obvious. Although misinformation has been shown to influence voting decisions, this is not necessarily a deviation from rational voting. An individual might indeed be tricked into a non-rational voting decision, or motivated to opt for the candidate who maximises the utility of their vote. Our aim is to explore the extent to which different kinds of misinformation obstruct rational voting. We propose to study rational voting in the laboratory, as it allows us to control for important factors that are inevitably imprecisely measured using survey data.

• Jeudi 19 octobre 2023 10:00-11:00

  R1-14

  WEBB Duncan (PSE) : Silence to Solidarity: Using Group Dynamics to Reduce Anti-Transgender Discrimination in India

  Résumé

  Discrimination is often believed to be the result of deep-seated prejudice against a minority, or of beliefs that can only change upon the revelation of new information. But social context — in particular, how people behave differently in groups — may be a more important determinant of discrimination than traditional theories of discrimination suggest. This paper shows that involving majority-group members in a group discussion and hiring decision can sharply reduce hiring discrimination against a stigmatized minority. I focus on discrimination against the transgender community in India, a highly visible and economically vulnerable group. In a control condition, participants on average sacri?ce almost double their daily food expenditure to avoid selecting a transgender individual to deliver food to their home. But if they were earlier involved in a group discussion and collective hiring decision with two of their neighbours, they no longer discriminate at all, even when making subsequent choices in private. This effect is stronger than the effect of informing people about the legal rights of transgender people, and the reduction in discrimination partially persists until around 1 month later. The results appear to be driven by the emergence of a strong pro-trans norm in the groups, supported by pro-social reasons for selecting transgender workers that persuade others to discriminate less.

• Vendredi 29 septembre 2023 11:00-12:00

  MSE salle S18

  MAYAUX Damien (PSE) : Welfare effects of salient marketing cues

  Résumé

  Online marketplaces are full of salient-yet-ambiguous marketing cues that steer consumers towards specific items. Platforms enjoy great freedom in choosing how cues look like (visual design) and which products they are assigned to (attribution mechanism). I study in an online choice experiment the effect of some visual design / attribution mechanism pairs on consumer choice and welfare. My main hypothesis is that, for some visual designs that are overtly positive - a golden thumb, a green circle - participants tend to follow blindly the cue no matter if it is assigned on good or bad items, while for some other visual designs that are salient but less positive - a blue road sign or a message in black font with capital letters - participants perform better than without the cue when it is on the best items and comparably to this baseline otherwise.

• Jeudi 9 mars 2023 10:00-11:00

  ANLLO Hernan (ENS) : Outcome context-dependence is not WEIRD: Comparing reinforcement- and description-based economic preferences worldwide

• Jeudi 10 novembre 2022 10:00-11:00

  HUANG Yuchen (PSE) : Meritocracy for the Meritocrats: an Experiment on the Cultural Interpretation of Meritocracy

  ZHEXUN MO Fred (PSE)

  BELGUISE Margot (Warwick)

• Jeudi 13 octobre 2022 10:00-11:00

  DEKEL Amit (PSE) : Testing myopic and farsighted stability concepts: a network formation experiment

• Jeudi 15 septembre 2022 10:00-11:00

  STAROPOLI Carine (PSE) : Impact des tarifs sur les choix de mode de transport

• Jeudi 23 juin 2022 10:00-10:45

  WEBB Duncan (PSE) : Laws, Norms, and Discrimination: Gay Rights in India

• Vendredi 15 avril 2022 11:00-12:00

  MSE

  KORDA Hélène : *

• Vendredi 18 mars 2022 11:00-12:00

  MSE (114)

  SAUCET Charlotte : *

• Jeudi 24 février 2022 10:00-11:00

  Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan

  HUANG Yuchen (PSE) : *

• Jeudi 17 février 2022 10:00-11:00

  Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan

  CHAVEZ Emmanuel (PSE) : *

• Vendredi 4 février 2022 11:00-12:00

  MSE (114)

  HENRY Emeric : Moral behavior: a tale of two images

  JACQUEMET Nicolas

  GALBIATI Roberto

• Vendredi 21 janvier 2022 11:00-12:00

  MSE (114)

  SCARELLI Thiago (PSE) : Financial Concerns and Labor Income Discounting

• Jeudi 24 juin 2021 11:00-12:00

  LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : Redistributive Preferences when Inequality is an Externality

  Morten Nyborg Stostad

• Jeudi 27 mai 2021 11:00-12:00

  ZAPPALÀ Guglielmo (PSE) : Drought exposure and accuracy: Motivated reasoning in climate change beliefs

  Résumé

  Despite scientific consensus, there is no unanimity among citizens in the beliefs about climate change. Understanding how people form beliefs about climate change and what drives their interpretation of climatic events is essential, especially in developing countries and among agricultural communities, who may most suffer from climate change consequences. Using survey data from rural households in Bangladesh matched with objective drought data, this paper studies how long-term average drought exposure and short-term deviations shape belief formation and accuracy in recollecting past drought events. In order to further investigate how agents interpret these past drought events, I use an instrumental variable approach to test and validate that individuals are subject to confirmation bias. The results show that the probability of overestimating the number of past drought events and the intensity with which individuals overestimate are significantly biased in the direction of their prior beliefs. The findings highlight the need of models that account for behavioral factors such as confirmation bias and motivated reasoning to study climate change preference formation, and its implications for effective communication.

• Jeudi 29 avril 2021 11:00-12:00

  https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/92401995708?pwd=SjU2ZnNWYzh0QnhuNXI4eG56ZXpEZz09

  SALAMANCA Andrés (PSE) : Values of games without transferable utility: An experimental approach

• Jeudi 25 mars 2021 11:30-12:30

  CHARROIN Liza (Université Paris 1) : Rumors diffusion in the lab

  Francis Bloch (PSE) and Sudipta Sarangi (Virginia Tech)

• Jeudi 11 mars 2021 11:00-12:00

  MUN Sofiia (CES, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) : Deliberate Randomization and Ambiguity: Is There a Connection?

  Elias Bouacida (Lancaster University, Management School)

• Jeudi 17 décembre 2020 11:00-12:00

  https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/91585525960?pwd=b0Evc2l2VlpuKzJiV1J6T2FSVTRDZz09

  TZINTZUN Iván (PSE) : The Causal Effect of Physical Activity on Health in Early Adulthood: A Gene By Environment Instrumental Variables Approach

  Lise Rochaix

• Jeudi 26 novembre 2020 11:00-12:00

  Zoom TBA

  COMOLA Margherita (PSE) : Bidding on Links: Experimental Evidence on Multi-object Auctions

• Vendredi 13 novembre 2020 11:00-12:00

  On line

  COMOLA Margherita (PSE) : TBA

  CHARROIN Liza (Université Paris 1) : TBA

• Vendredi 13 novembre 2020 11:00-12:00

  CHARROIN Liza (Université Paris 1) : Anticonformism: An experiment with matching pennies

  Béatrice Boulu-Reshef and Agnieszka Rusinowska

• Mercredi 29 avril 2020 15:00-16:00

  LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : Motivated Beliefs and Preferences for Redistribution

• Jeudi 19 mars 2020 11:00-12:00

  LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : Motivated Beliefs and Preferences for Redistribution (canceled)

• Vendredi 28 février 2020 11:00-11:45

  MSE, Room B2-1

  RACHIDI Tobias (PSE) : Double-sided opportunism in infrastructure investment

  Béatrice Boulu-Reshef and Marian Moszoro

• Jeudi 30 janvier 2020 10:30-11:30

  R2-20

  MUN Soffia (PSE) : Econometric estimation of Prospect Theory for Natural Ambiguity

• Vendredi 29 novembre 2019 11:00-12:00

  MSE Salle S/1

  MIKEL Hualde (University of Navarre) : On the aversion to incomplete preferences. An axiomatic approach

• Jeudi 23 mai 2019 10:00-10:45

  Jourdan, R2-20

  LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : Principals' Distributive Preferences and the Incentivization of Agents

• Jeudi 21 mars 2019 10:00-10:45

  Jourdan R1-14

  MUN Soffia (PSE) : Risk and Ambiguity Preferences: Attitudes of the Self and Beliefs About Others

• Jeudi 21 février 2019 10:00-10:45

  PALMINTERI Stefano (ENS) : Learning to speculate: A neuroeconomics approach (R1-13)

  BASILE Garcia (ENS)

• Jeudi 20 décembre 2018 10:00-10:45

  Jourdan, R1-11

  JACQUEL Pierre (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES) : The impact of overconfidence on information cascade: A new experimental approach

• Jeudi 15 novembre 2018 10:00-10:45

  COMPTE Olivier (PSE) : A war game

• Vendredi 26 octobre 2018 10:00-10:45

  MSE S/18

  WANG Olivier (NYU Stern) : Information curse in financial forecasting

• Jeudi 27 septembre 2018 11:00-11:45

  Jourdan: R1-14

  COMOLA Margherita (PSE) : Social and economic inequality

  MERLINO Luca Paolo (Antwerpen University)

• Jeudi 17 mai 2018 10:00-11:00

  R2-20

  CETRE Sophie (PSE - Sciences Po) : Do incentives conflict with fairness

• Jeudi 12 avril 2018 10:00-11:00

  Campus Jourdan, R1-16

  HEMON Antoine : Should We Take Experimental Recommendations at Face Value ? Social Image Motivation & Self-Sorting in a Public-Good Experiment

• Jeudi 29 mars 2018 10:00-11:00

  Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

  SINGH Juni : Social proximity and the choice of monitors: A lab in the field experiment in Nepal

  GIULIO Iacobelli (PSE)

• Jeudi 8 février 2018 10:00-11:00

  LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : An experimental study on the link between anti-social preferences and within firm mobility

• Jeudi 18 janvier 2018 10:00-11:00

  BOUACIDA Elias (PSE) : Pay-for-certainty, an experiment to elicit (in)complete preferences

• Jeudi 14 décembre 2017 10:00-11:00

  salle R1-10, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

  LASLIER Jean-François (CNRS-PSE) : The shooter anxiety at the penalty kick

  ARRONDEL Luc (PSE)

  DUHAUTOIS Richard (CNAM)

• Jeudi 30 novembre 2017 11:30-12:30

  salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

  COMOLA Margherita (PSE) : An experiment on strategic targeting in networks

  RUSINOWSKA Agnieszka (Paris 1)

  VILLEVAL Marie Claire (CNRS - University of Lyon)

• Jeudi 12 octobre 2017 10:00-11:00

  R1-15

  ETILÉ Fabrice (PSE) : Personal Identity and Preferences: Empirical extensions

  YIN Rémi (PSE)

• Jeudi 21 septembre 2017 09:30-10:30

  Test

• Vendredi 1er septembre 2017

  Behavior Working Group

  Résumé

  This paper analyzes the incentives that arise within an organization when communication is restricted to a particular network structure (e.g., a hierarchy). We show that restricting communication between the principal and agents may create incentives for the agents to misbehave when transmitting information and tasks throughout the organization. Such incentives can render the principal's most preferred outcome infeasible and therefore introduces a trade off between the cost of communication borne by the principal and the benefit of curbing incentives to deviate induced by the communication structure. To remedy this issue, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the topology of the network of communication such that restricting communication to a particular network does not restrict the set of outcomes that the principal could otherwise achieve. In this sense, we show that for any underlying incentives and any outcome available when communication is unrestricted, there exists a (finite) communication scheme restricted to a particular network that implements this outcome (i.e., does not induce agents to misbehave in the communication phase) if and only if that network satisfies our conditions.

• Vendredi 23 juin 2017 10:00-10:45

  MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle du 6ème étage) 75013 Paris

  "Evaluating average confidence (psychology) towards a bargaining task (economics)"

• Jeudi 1er juin 2017 11:00-11:45

  DORIN Camille : Socio-economic status and redistribution behavior: an experiment

• Jeudi 27 avril 2017 11:00-11:45

  An experimental approach to preventive behavior

• Jeudi 23 mars 2017 11:00-11:45

  Room R1-14, Jourdan

  ETILÉ Fabrice (PSE) : Personal Identity and Preferences: measurement issues and lab experiment

  YIN Rémi (PSE)

• Vendredi 3 février 2017 10:00-10:45

  Room 115, Maison des Sciences Economiques

  BOULU-RESHEF Béatrice : Towards the management of donors: Experiments in the lab and in the field on charitable donations to a Arts firm

• Jeudi 1er décembre 2016 11:00-11:45

  A2 room, Jourdan

  SENIK Claudia : Choice experiments to elicit inequality aversion

• Vendredi 25 novembre 2016 10:00-10:45

  B2.1 room, Maison des Sciences Economiques

  HEMON Antoine : Social Image Motivation or Social Image Constraint ? Voluntary Participation in Public Good Experiments

• Jeudi 13 octobre 2016 10:45-11:45

  DSS room, Building B, 2nd floor, Jourdan

  BOUACIDA Elias (PSE) : Indifference or Indecision: an Experiment using Choice Correspondences

• 0000

  MSE Salle 115

  VARDAXOGLOU Laurence : Effect of misinformation on voting in the laboratory

  SAVEY Lily

  Résumé

  For health-related matters, being misinformed leads individuals to make bad decisions. In politics, it is less obvious. Although misinformation has been shown to influence voting decisions, this is not necessarily a deviation from rational voting. An individual might indeed be tricked into a non-rational voting decision, or motivated to opt for the candidate who maximises the utility of their vote. Our aim is to explore the extent to which different kinds of misinformation obstruct rational voting. We propose to study rational voting in the laboratory, as it allows us to control for important factors that are inevitably imprecisely measured using survey data.

• 0000

  B2.1 room, Maison des Sciences Economiques

  HEMON Antoine : Social Image Motivation or Social Image Constraint ? Voluntary Participation in Public Good Experiments