Séminaires

Séminaire interne PSE

• Prochainement
• Archives

Prochainement

• Vendredi 13 octobre 2023 12:00-14:30

  SHLEIFER Andrei (Harvard University) : "Cognitive Economics"

  Invited guest lecture by Andrei Shleifer (Harvard University)

  Résumé

  Human choices are often unstable, dependent on normatively irrelevant features of the problem, and variable across people in similar situations. Standard economics resolves these challenges by constructing exotic preferences. Behavioral economics deals with them by proliferating biases. Neither unifies different phenomena effectively. An alternative strategy is to start with regularities of human cognition, such as perception, attention, and memory, and to derive how people represent problems, form beliefs, and make choices from those foundations. This approach unifies theoretically a broad range of puzzling findings, and incorporates new strategies of measurement and prediction. We illustrate the ideas of cognitive economics with examples of finance, macroeconomics, labor economics, political economy, and risk assessment using both experimental and field data.

• Vendredi 24 novembre 2023 12:00-13:00

  FLEURBAEY Marc (PSE) : TBA

  GORDON Matthew (PSE)

  Résumé

  TBA

Archives

• Vendredi 22 septembre 2023 12:00-13:00

  GOEDDE Julius (PSE) : *Satiation, unraveling and compressing prices. Designing peer-to-peer platforms with internal currencies

  ALTMANN Samuel (PSE) : Choice, Welfare, and Market Design: An Empirical Investigation of Feeding America's Choice System

  Résumé

  I examine how peer-to-peer sharing platforms that use internal currencies instead of real money should set prices. Individuals must earn currency by supplying on the platform and can only spend it by consuming on the same platform. Beyond this difference, such systems often mimic real markets where prices equalize demand and supply. I argue that non-market-clearing prices can be superior. As individuals typically only have a limited demand for the specific goods on the platform, some may become satiated and reduce their supply. This might induce others to reduce their supply in turn and thus lead to unraveling. I illustrate with a stylized model of a dynamic exchange economy that reducing the price of attractive goods may increase their supply and aggregate welfare. In the empirical part, I focus on a widely-used platform for exchanging holiday homes. Using proprietary data on the universe of transactions I confirm key predictions of the model. My results suggest that satiation is quantitatively important. Thus, compressed prices might indeed improve upon market-clearing prices - despite possible side-effects like misallocation. A broader insight is that lessons from traditional markets may not easily extend to markets without real money. ******************************************************************************** Feeding America, an organisation responsible for feeding 130,000 Americans every day, distributes donated food among a network of participating food banks. Feeding America’s allocation mechanism, the ‘Choice System’, uses first-price auctions to allow food banks to signal which types of food they need from Feeding America. This provides food banks a large degree of choice over the types of food they receive. This paper examines the welfare and distributional consequences of enabling this choice. I apply a dynamic auction model to Choice System bidding data, estimating the distribution of food banks’ heterogeneous and time-varying needs. I then use these estimates to compare the Choice System to the previous allocation mechanism employed by Feeding America which gave food banks very limited choice. I estimate that the Choice System increased welfare by the equivalent of a 17.1% increase in the quantity of food being allocated.

• Vendredi 26 mai 2023 12:30-13:30

  Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan

  ASTIER Nicolas (PSE et Ecole des Ponts) : On the use of significant digits to convey statistical precision - ASTIER

  HERR Annika (Institute of Health Economics, Leibniz University Hannover) : Provider density and quality in German ambulatory long-term care: Which role does labor supply play? - HERR

  Résumé

  Most empirical estimates reported in economics are output from software routines. By default, these routines report a fixed number of decimal digits, typically three. We argue this practice represents a missed opportunity to convey statistical precision. We propose a statistical testing procedure that could be easily implemented to avoid both reporting too many digits that lack statistical significance and failing to report precisely estimated digits. Applying our methodology to all articles published in the American Economic Review between 2000 and 2022, we show that over 60% of printed digits for coefficient estimates are not statistically significant at standard levels. Authors : Nicolas Astier and Frank Wolak ***************** Ambulatory long-term care (LTC) aims to assist elderly individuals in their own homes. In this study, we analyze the causal impact of the recent increases in provider density due to increasing demand on the quality of ambulatory LTC. We employ data from publicly available transparency reports from 14,000 ambulatory care units in Germany between 2011 and 2019. Our instrumental variable approach exploits information on the nursing home market. Our primary findings indicate that an increase in provider density leads to a decrease in the quality of ambulatory LTC. A potential channel through which this effect may occur is a shortage of qualified nursing personnel. Our conclusion is that a trade-off exists between market entry, which enables better access to professional care, and higher quality. Therefore, we recommend further investment in skilled nursing personnel. Authors : Annika Herr, Maximilian Lückemann and Olena Izhak

• Vendredi 14 avril 2023 12:30-13:30

  Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan

  LEDUC Mathieu (PSE) : Corporate Culture and Organizational Fragility

  VANDEN EYNDE Oliver (PSE) : Cooperation between National Armies: Evidence from the border regions in the Sahel

  Résumé

  Corporate Culture and Organizational Fragility : Matt LEDUC Complex organizations accomplish tasks through many steps of collaboration among workers. Corporate culture supports collaborations by establishing norms and reducing misunderstandings. Because a strong corporate culture relies on costly, voluntary investments by many workers, we model it as an organizational public good, subject to standard free-riding problems, which become severe in large organizations. Our main finding is that voluntary contributions to culture can nevertheless be sustained, because an organization’s equilibrium productivity is endogenously highly sensitive to individual contributions. However, the completion of complex tasks is then necessarily fragile to small shocks that damage the organization’s culture. ***** Cooperation between National Armies: Evidence from the border regions in the Sahel : Oliver Vanden Eynde joint with Marion Richard (UCLouvain/PSE) Military interventions often involve cooperation between different national armies. In this project, we investigate the extent to which the porous international borders in the Sahel region affect geographical patterns of conflict, and how the creation of an international armed force that can cross borders (the G5 Sahel) changed these patterns. We find that the G5 mission lowered the intensity of conflict locally, and that it changed patterns of geographical conflict propagation.

  Texte intégral [pdf]

• Vendredi 31 mars 2023 12:30-13:30

  Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan

  BOZIO Antoine (PSE/EHESS) : Follow the money! Why dividends overreact to flat-tax reforms”, joint with Laurent Bach, Brice Fabre, Arthur Guillouzouic, Claire Leroy and Clement Malgouyres

  Résumé

  We estimate behavioral responses to dividend taxation using recent French reforms: a rate hike and, five years later, a cut. Exploiting tax data at household and firm-level, we find very large dividend tax elasticities to both reforms. Individuals who control firms adjust dividend receipts instantaneously, accounting for most of the aggregate dividend reaction. Investment is insensitive to dividend taxation. Dividend adjustments are instead driven by corporate saving, as owner-managers treat firms as tax-free saving vehicles. Small businesses’ profits decline following dividend tax increases, suggesting firms also serve as tax-free consumption vehicles.

  Texte intégral [pdf]

• Vendredi 17 février 2023 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  BALLESTER Miguel (Oxford University) : Choice-Based Foundations of Ordered Logit

  APOUEY Bénédicte (PSE, CNRS) : "The health of workers in the gig economy"

• Vendredi 16 décembre 2022 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  DURANTE Ruben (BSE) : Media Capture by Banks

  VANDEN EYNDE Oliver (PSE) : Cooperation between National Armies: Evidence from the border regions in the Sahel

  Résumé

  with Andrea Fabiani, Luc Laeven, José-Luis Peydró Do banks exploit lending relationships with media companies to promote favorable news coverage? To test this hypothesis we map the connections between banks and the top newspapers in several European countries and study how they affect news coverage of two important financial issues. First we look at bank earnings announcements and find that newspapers are significantly more likely to cover announcements by their lenders, relative to other banks, when they report profits than when they report losses. Such pro-lender bias applies to both general-interest and financial newspapers, and is stronger for newspapers and banks that are more financially vulnerable. Second, we look at a broader public interest issue: the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis. We find that newspapers connected to banks more exposed to stressed sovereign bonds are more likely to promote a narrative of the crisis favorable to banks and to oppose debt-restructuring measures detrimental to creditors.

• Vendredi 25 novembre 2022 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  DISDIER Anne-Célia (PSE, INRAE) : Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds

  DIETRICH Franz (PSE, CNRS) : International diffusion of food innovations and nutrition transition

  Résumé

  Co-author: K. Spiekermann (LSE) Does pre-voting group deliberation increase majority competence? To address this question, we develop a non-game-theoretic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is beneficial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Simulations and theoretic arguments confirm this. But there are five systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always through increasing Failure 1. Our analysis recommends deliberation that is ‘participatory', ‘even', but possibly ‘unequal', i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but possibly privileges some persons.

  Texte intégral [pdf]

• Vendredi 14 octobre 2022 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  RICKNE Johanna (Stockholm University) : *

  JEHIEL Philippe (PSE, ENCP)

• Vendredi 30 septembre 2022 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  PIGUILLEM Facundo (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance) : Government Debt, Capital Taxation and Redistribution

  FRIEDMAN Evan (PSE) : Stochastic Choice in Games

  Kirill Shakhnov (University of Surrey)

• Vendredi 15 avril 2022 12:30-13:30

  R2-21

  ETILÉ Fabrice (PSE) : *

  KOESSLER Frédéric (PSE)

• Vendredi 25 mars 2022 12:30-13:30

  R1-09

  MACÉ Antonin (PSE) : Voting in Shareholders Meetings

  BREDA Thomas (PSE) : Under-Reporting of Firm Size Around Size-Dependent Regulation Thresholds: Evidence from France

  Résumé

  This paper studies the informational efficiency of voting mechanisms in shareholder meetings. When the management does not affect the proposal being voted on, we show that voting mechanisms are more efficient when their ballot space is richer. Moreover, efficiency requires full divisibility of the votes. When the management has agenda power, we uncover a novel trade-off?: more efficient mechanisms provide worse incentives to select good proposals. This negative effect can be large enough to wash out the higher voting efficiency of even the most efficient mechanisms.

  Texte intégral [pdf]

• Vendredi 11 février 2022 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  LEBRETON Maël (PSE) : Incentive motivation differently affects beliefs and confidence judgments.

  CASELLA Alessandra (Columbia) : Two Lab Experiments on Alternative Voting Rules: Cumulative Voting and Liquid Democracy

  Résumé

  Alessandra Casella (co-authors: Joseph Campbell, Lucas de Lara, Jeffrey Guo, Michelle Jiang, Victoria Mooers, & Dilip Ravindran): US courts have used Cumulative Voting (CV) to remedy violations of the Voting Rights Acts and increase minority representation. Under CV, each voter has as many votes as open positions but can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Although each voter is treated equally, theory predicts that CV increases both minority’s turnout relative to the majority, and the minority’s share of seats won. Liquid Democracy (LD) is celebrated by supporters as the golden medium between direct and representative democracy. Under LD, decisions are taken by referendum, but voters are allowed to delegate their votes. When experts are correctly identified, theory shows that the outcome can be superior to simple majority voting. In the lab, CV's theoretical promise is satisfied: the minority's turnout and its share of seats both increases. LD, however, falls short of its potential: systematic over-delegation leads to its underperformance relative to simple majority. Maël Lebreton (co-authors: Nahuel Salem-Garcia & Sébastien Massoni): Countless reports of over-optimism, overconfidence, wishful-thinking and desirability biases suggest that a general motivated-cognition bias distort all beliefs uniformly. Here, we provide evidence against this view, and demonstrate that motivational biases differentially affect proper beliefs, i.e. probability judgments over (external) states, and confidence judgements, i.e. probability judgments over ones’ own actions or statements being correct. Across multiple experiments, we systematically manipulate the agency of decisions over ambiguous states-of-the-world and the valence of monetary incentives for accurate probabilistic judgments about the correctness of those decisions. We identify a clear effect of the net incentive value on confidence, which vanishes when considering beliefs. These results, which falsify the most general interpretations of motivated-belief theories, suggest that beliefs and confidence stem from fundamentally different cognitive mechanisms. Consequently, although similarly ubiquitous and apparently related, overconfidence and (over)optimism biases might have different causes and remedies.

• Vendredi 17 décembre 2021 12:30-13:30

  R2-01

  D ALBIS Hippolyte (PSE) : Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Double Coincidence of Wants without Money

  TERCIEUX Olivier (PSE) : Global Uncertainty and International Migration to Western Europe

  Résumé

  Co-authors: Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford University), Julien Combe (CREST), Yinghua He (Rice University), Victor Hiller (Paris 2), Robert Shimer (University of Chicago). For an incompatible patient-donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. Our proposal, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, uses “memory” as a medium of exchange to eliminate these timing constraints. In a dynamic matching model, we prove that Unpaired delivers a waiting time of patients close to optimal and substantially shorter than currently utilized state-of-the-art algorithms. Using a rich administrative dataset from France, we show that Unpaired achieves a match rate of 57 percent and an average waiting time of 440 days. The (infeasible) optimal algorithm is only slightly better (58 percent and 425 days); state-of-the-art algorithms deliver less than 34 percent and more than 695 days. We draw similar conclusions from the simulations of two large U.S. platforms. Lastly, we propose a range of solutions that can address the potential practical concerns of Unpaired.

• Vendredi 26 novembre 2021 12:30-14:00

  R2-01

  WREN-LEWIS Liam (PSE) : Complementarities in Infrastructure: Evidence from Rural India

  OLLIVIER Hélène (PSE) : Estimating the Effects of Incomplete Regulation on Regulated Firms and their Competitors: An Application to the EU ETS

  Résumé

  Co-author: Oliver Vanden Eynde (PSE) Complementarities between infrastructure projects have been understudied. Our paper examines interactions in the impacts of large-scale road construction, electrification, and mobile phone coverage programs in rural India. We find strong evidence of complementary impacts between roads and electricity on agricultural production: dry season cropping increases significantly when villages receive both, but not when they receive one without the other. These complementarities are associated with a shift of cropping patterns towards market crops and with improved economic conditions. In contrast, we find no consistent evidence of complementarities for the mobile coverage program.

• Vendredi 22 octobre 2021 12:30-14:00

  R2-01

  STEWART Colin (University of Toronto) : Attention Please!

  STANCANELLI Elena (PSE) : A tale of hours worked for pay from home before and after the Great Recession: learning from high-frequency diaries

  .

  Résumé

  We study the impact of manipulating the attention of a decision-maker who learns sequentially about a number of items before making a choice. Under natural assumptions on the decision-maker’s strategy, directing attention toward one item increases its likelihood of being chosen regardless of its value. This result applies when the decisionmaker can reject all items in favor of an outside option with known value; if no outside option is available, the direction of the effect of manipulation depends on the value of the item. A similar result applies to manipulation of choices in bandit problems. http://individual.utoronto.ca/colinstewart/ap.pdf

• Vendredi 28 mai 2021 13:45-15:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Vendredi 28 mai 2021 13:15-13:45

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Vendredi 16 avril 2021 13:45-15:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Vendredi 16 avril 2021 13:15-13:45

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Vendredi 26 mars 2021 13:45-15:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Vendredi 26 mars 2021 13:15-13:45

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Vendredi 12 février 2021 13:45-15:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Vendredi 18 décembre 2020 13:46-14:15

  online

  OH Susanna (PSE) : Gender Norms in Marriage and Female Labor Productivity

  Résumé

  This project investigates whether gender norms lead women to hold back their potential in the labor market. While the existing literature has shown that women tend to earn less than their husbands, there is limited direct evidence on whether women actively avoid earning more than their spouses and the determinants of such behavior. The experiment engages married couples working as casual laborers in a short-term manufacturing job that pays piece-rate on output. The experiment provides women an extra hour to work without this difference being salient, making it likely that they could earn more than their husbands. After husbands finish piece-rate production, women are randomized into one of three conditions in which 1) wife is informed of her husband’s production and expects both spouses to learn the couple’s individual production at the end of the day, 2) wife is informed of her husband’s production and expects that only she will learn the couple’s individual production, or 3) both spouses are only informed of their joint production. Pilot results show that women in the last two conditions achieve on average one hour’s worth of production more than that of their husbands, suggesting that women do not have intrinsic concerns about earning more than their husbands. However, this productivity gap disappears when women expect their husbands to also find out about individual production, suggesting that women care about husbands’ beliefs or reactions.

• Vendredi 18 décembre 2020 13:15-13:40

  online

  VELLODI Nikhil (PSE) : Insider Imitation and Privacy on Platforms (co-author: Erik Madsen (NYU)

• Vendredi 27 novembre 2020 13:45-15:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  FLEURBAEY MARC : *

• Vendredi 27 novembre 2020 12:00-15:00

  LASLIER Jean-François (CNRS-PSE) : JOINT EVENT with PSE collaborative project “Economie et Philosophie” : The French Citizens' Convention on Climate: A forerunner to future democracy?

  APOUEY Bénédicte (PSE, CNRS)

  FLEURBAEY Marc (PSE)

  DRYZEK John (University of Canberra)

  FUNG Archon (Harvard)

  GIRARD Charles (Université Jean Moulin - Lyon)

  LANDEMORE Hélène (Yale )

  ROUSSIN Juliette (Université de Laval - Québec)

  Résumé

  The Paris School of Economics is organising a workshop on the French Citizen Convention on Climate. A presentation will be made by researchers who have observed the whole process of this citizen assembly that started in October 2019. Then a panel discussion will be offered by specialists of deliberative democracy and political philosophy. Are such citizen participatory schemes a political sideshow or a key component of an ideal deliberative democracy? Programm: 12h-13h: Presentation of the Convention, by Bénédicte Apouey and Jean-François Laslier (CNRS-PSE) 13h-15h: Panel discussion with John Dryzek (University of Canberra) , Archon Fung (Harvard Kennedy School), Charles Girard (Université Jean Moulin de Lyon), Hélène Landemore (Yale University) and Juliette Roussin (Université Laval à Québec), moderated by Marc Fleurbaey (CNRS-PSE and ENS-CERES).

• Jeudi 25 juin 2020 12:00-13:30

  ZOOM

  MILCENT Carine (PSE) : *

  COIMBRA Nuno (PSE)

• Jeudi 28 mai 2020 12:30-14:30

  *

• Jeudi 30 avril 2020 14:00-15:30

  ZOOM

  FERRIÈRE Axelle (PSE) : Escaping the Losses from Trade: The Impact of Heterogeneity on Skill Acquisition

  KETZ Philipp (PSE)

  G. Navarro and R.Reyes-Heroles

  Résumé

  Future generations of workers can invest in education, acquire skill and avoid the negative consequences of trade openness for low-skilled workers. However, not all members of these future generations might have the resources required to make such investments. In this paper we exploit variation in exposure to import penetration shocks across space in the United States to show that greater import penetration increases college enrollment and that this increase is driven by future workers in richer households. To analyze the welfare implications of the effects of trade openness on college enrollment, we propose a dynamic multi-region model of international trade with heterogeneous agents. The model features incomplete credit markets and costly endogenous skill acquisition. We calibrate the model to match changes in aggregate trade data for the United States and differential import exposure across U.S. regions. Lower import barriers generate increased college enrollment and welfare gains for all workers in the long-run. However, these gains are concentrated on workers with a college education, whose welfare gains are twice as large as those of non-college workers. While all workers in the manufacturing sector lose from grater trade openness, a small number of college educated workers in manufacturing with low wealth experience the greatest losses. Increasing college enrollment for new cohorts over time plays a crucial role in allowing new generations of workers to escape the potential welfare losses form trade. However, poor dynasties take the longest to acquire skills. They are therefore the last to experience positive gains from trade openness, and entire generations may not realize any gains within a life-time.

• Jeudi 26 mars 2020 12:30-14:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Jeudi 27 février 2020 12:30-14:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Jeudi 12 décembre 2019 12:30-14:00

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  LAMBERT-MOGILIANSKY Ariane (PSE) : *

  BEZIN Emeline

• Jeudi 28 novembre 2019 12:00-13:30

  KU Hyejin (UCL) : *

  ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina (PSE)

• Jeudi 17 octobre 2019 12:00-13:30

  salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  Social and economic inequality

  Résumé

  We present the preliminary results from a lab experiment investigating how economic inequality and network structure affect public good provision. We frame the experiment as a local public good game: in the lab, subjects are assigned a network position, and an endowment to be split between a private good and a public good that benefits direct neighbors as well. Our aim is to test the behavioral validity of the equilibrium predictions, and whether subjects are able to coordinate away from equilibrium to maximize welfare.

• Jeudi 26 septembre 2019 12:00-13:30

  R2.02

  TBA

  TBA

  Résumé

  TBA

  Texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 26 septembre 2019 12:00-13:30

  TBA

• Jeudi 26 septembre 2019 12:00-13:30

  *

• Jeudi 26 septembre 2019 12:00-13:30

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  *

• Jeudi 26 septembre 2019 12:00-13:30

  salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

  VERDIER Thierry (PSE) : From preferences to representation

  LASLIER Jean-François (CNRS-PSE) : Samaritan Bundles: Fundraising Competition and Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects (joint with Gani Aldashev and Marco Marini)

  test

  Résumé

  I will introduce and analyse some ideas that have been proposed in order to give a positive answer to the question: Is it possible to achieve proportional representation while voting for individual candidates rather than for parties?

  Texte intégral [pdf]

• 0000

  ALTMANN Samuel (PSE) : *Satiation, unraveling and compressing prices. Designing peer-to-peer platforms with internal currencies

  GOEDDE Julius (PSE) : Choice, Welfare, and Market Design: An Empirical Investigation of Feeding America's Choice System

  Résumé

  I examine how peer-to-peer sharing platforms that use internal currencies instead of real money should set prices. Individuals must earn currency by supplying on the platform and can only spend it by consuming on the same platform. Beyond this difference, such systems often mimic real markets where prices equalize demand and supply. I argue that non-market-clearing prices can be superior. As individuals typically only have a limited demand for the specific goods on the platform, some may become satiated and reduce their supply. This might induce others to reduce their supply in turn and thus lead to unraveling. I illustrate with a stylized model of a dynamic exchange economy that reducing the price of attractive goods may increase their supply and aggregate welfare. In the empirical part, I focus on a widely-used platform for exchanging holiday homes. Using proprietary data on the universe of transactions I confirm key predictions of the model. My results suggest that satiation is quantitatively important. Thus, compressed prices might indeed improve upon market-clearing prices - despite possible side-effects like misallocation. A broader insight is that lessons from traditional markets may not easily extend to markets without real money. ********************** Feeding America, an organisation responsible for feeding 130,000 Americans every day, distributes donated food among a network of participating food banks. Feeding America’s allocation mechanism, the ‘Choice System’, uses first-price auctions to allow food banks to signal which types of food they need from Feeding America. This provides food banks a large degree of choice over the types of food they receive. This paper examines the welfare and distributional consequences of enabling this choice. I apply a dynamic auction model to Choice System bidding data, estimating the distribution of food banks’ heterogeneous and time-varying needs. I then use these estimates to compare the Choice System to the previous allocation mechanism employed by Feeding America which gave food banks very limited choice. I estimate that the Choice System increased welfare by the equivalent of a 17.1% increase in the quantity of food being allocated.