La science économique au service de la société
Roger Guesnerie

Roger Guesnerie

Professeur émérite PSE

Titulaire Chaire Théorie éco. et org. sociale Collège de France


Campus Jourdan – 48 Boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris

5e étage, bureau 56

Tél. 01 80 52 17 06

Président d'honneur de PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris

Site personnel
  • Rationalité limitée
  • Economie du changement climatique

Enseignement 2011-2012

École des hautes études en sciences sociales

Formation Analyse et politique économiques

Année 2011-2012

La coordination des anticipations : éléments pour une théorie des crises économiques et financières
Expectational Coordination : Towards a theory of financial and economic crises

Roger Guesnerie



The PDF files of all core readings are available on the website, including chapters from the books. Core readings are essential for the understanding of the material presented in the class, and they should be read in advance. They are given here in the order they should be studied.


Part 1: 1A: The 2008 crisis.


Core readings:


Gorton, G. (2008), “The Panic of 2007”, Working paper Yale School of Management and NBER.

Hellwig, M. (2009), “Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis”. De Economist, 157, pp 129 -207.

“World Economic Outlook: Crisis and Recovery”, Chapter 3: From Recession to Recovery: How soon and how strong?. A survey by the staff of the International Monetary Fund, April 2009.

“World Economic Outlook: Crisis and Recovery”, Chapter 4: How Linkages Fuel the Fire: The transmission of financial stress from advanced to emerging economies. A survey by the staff of the International Monetary Fund, April 2009.




Admati, A., DeMarzo, P., Hellwig, M. and Pfleiderer, P. (2011), “Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive”. Stanford University Working Papers Series, N° 86.

Clerc, L. (2008), “A Primer on the Subprime Crisis”, Banque de France, Occasional Papers N° 4.

Farmer, R. (2011), “Confidence, Crashes and Animal Spirits”, Working Papers Departament of economics, UCLA.

Kirman, A. (2011), “The Crisis in Economics Theory”,  Rivista Italiana Degli Economisti, Vol-1.

Lovell, M. (1986), “Test of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis”, The American Economic Review, 76(1), pp 110-124.

Microstructures de Marches”, Initiative de recherche de la Fondation Institut Europlace de Finance, Crédit Agrciole Cheuvreux – Collège de France. Comité d’Orientation, 2010.

Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2008), “Banking Crises: An Equal Opportunity Menace”, Working Paper.


Part 1: 1B:


Core readings: Introduction to Expectational coordination.


Nagel, R.M. (1995), “Unravelling in guessing games. An experimental study.” American Economic Review,  85(5), pp. 1313-1325.

Ritzberger, K. (2000), "Foundations of non cooperative game theory", Oxford University Press. Chapter 5: “Solving Games”.

Cooper, Russell W. and Andrew John (1988) “Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 103: 441-463.

Guesnerie, R. (1992) “An Exploration of the Eductive Justifications of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis.” American Economic Review, 82 (5) - sections I-II, pp. 1254—1268.

Guesnerie, R. (2002), "Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge", Econometrica, especially pp. 1-20.

Muth, J. (1961), "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements". Econometrica 29, 315-335.

Sutan, A. and willinger, M.,(2003). “Prévision de prix et coordination par les croyances : une étude expérimentale”,




Aumann, R. , and A. Brandenburger (1995), “Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium.” Econometrica 63:1161-1180.

Aumann, R. and Dreze, J. (2008). “Rational Expectations in Games”, American Economic Review 98(1), pp 72-86.

Basu, K. , and J.W. Weibull (1991). “Strategy Subsets Closed under Rational Behaviour.” Economic Letters, 36:141-146.

Bernheim, B.D. (1984). “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior.” Econometrica 52:1007-28.

Gabay, D. and H. Moulin (1980). On the Uniqueness and Stability of Nash Equilibria in Noncooperative Games. Applied Stochastic Control in Econometrics and Management Science. Amsterdam, North Holland, Bensousson, Kleindorfer and Tapiero: 115-158.

Geanakoplos, J. . 1992. “Common Knowledge.”  Journal of Economic Perspectives 6-4:53-82.

Hommes, C., (1991), "Adaptive learning and the road to chaos, the case of Cobweb", Economics Letters, 36, p. 127-132.

Hommes, C., (1994), "Dynamics of the cobweb model with adaptive expectations and non-linear supply and demand", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 24, p. 315-335.

Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts. (1990). “Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities.Econometrica 47:1337-1351.

Pearce, D. (1984). “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection.” Econometrica 52:1029-1050.

Tan, T. and S.R. Costa da Werlang, (1988), "On Aumann's Notion of Common Knowledge, an Alternative Approach", Journal of Economic Theory, 45, p. 370-391