Gabrielle Demange

PSE Emeritus Professor

CV IN ENGLISH
RePEc page
  • Emeritus Professor
  • EHESS
Research groups
Research themes
  • Game Theory
  • Risk
  • Social and Economic Networks
  • Social Choice Theory
Contact

Address :48 boulevard Jourdan,
75014 Paris, France

Campus: Campus Jourdan
Floor: 6
Office: 04
Declaration of interest

Publications HAL

  • Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games Journal article

    In a cooperative game, coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units. Stable outcomes (in the core) are those blocked by no coalition. This paper has two objectives. First, building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, I unify and extend previous results on the existence of stable outcomes in simple games. Second, I review how and when the core approach applies in more general settings and may help to predict the stable splitting of a whole group into disjoint coalitions.
    Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics

    Published in

  • On the resolution of cross-liabilities Journal article

    In a variety of systems, in particular in a financial system, entities hold liabilities on each other. The reimbursement abilities are intertwined, thereby potentially generating coordination failures and cascades of defaults calling for orderly resolution. With a single indebted firm, a bankruptcy law organizes such an orderly resolution. With cross-liabilities, a resolution rule should be defined at the system level to account for all those affected, directly or indirectly. This paper investigates such rules assuming their primary goal is to avoid defaults on creditors external to the system, say banks’ defaults on customers’ deposits. I define and characterize the constrained-proportional rule building on two approaches: the minimization of an inequality measure on the reimbursements (made and received) and the axiomatization through desirable properties.
    Journal: Mathematical Programming

    Published in

  • Simple visibility design in network games Book section

    Individuals interact through social media networks by posting contributions, comments and the like. These actions entail complementarities and generate spillovers. A social media carefully designs its platform, often with the objective of increasing users’ activity. Here I study visibility strategies, which promote some individuals by making their contributions more visible than others’. Under some specifications, optimal strategies are simple, making visible the individuals whose total impact (total number of followers for example) is maximal. Comparisons with other targeting strategies are discussed.

    Published in

  • Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games Pre-print, Working paper

    In a cooperative game, coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units. Stable outcomes (in the core) are those blocked by no coalition. This paper has two objectives. First, building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, I unify and extend previous results on the existence of stable outcomes in simple games. Second, I review how and when the core approach applies in more general settings and may help to predict the stable splitting of a whole group into disjoint coalitions

    Published in

  • On the choice of central counterparties in the EU Journal article

    We study competition between European Union’s Central CounterParties (CCPs) on the credit default swap (CDS) market. Using data on market shares, we show that CCPs have a monopoly for single-name CDSs and compete on indices along various dimensions. Using transactions data, we focus on the major dealers who alternatively clear their transactions on the two main CCPs. Estimating their choice of CCP reveals that fees, CCPs’ robustness and activity, dealers’ risk, and market volatility are significant. Dealers’ positions indicate that saving on collateral costs is secondary relative to the benefits of dual membership and quality.
    Journal: Journal of Financial Markets

    Published in

All publications

Tabs

 

News

  • President of the Game Theory Society 2024-2026

  • Executive Vice President of the Game Theory Society 2022-2024

  • Elected at the Council of the Econometric Society 2020-2023
  • Elected foreign member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2019-
  • ANR: Recipient of the Grant FIRR “Financial Infrastructure: Risks and Regulation” 2019-2023. 
    • Final workshop – 5-6 June 2023, Workshop

 

Recent works

 

  • Recent works are on the first page. The full list of publications is on the vita.
  • Old unpublished paper Strategyproofness in the assignment market game. Laboratoire d’économétrie de l’École polytechnique. (1982).
  • BOOKS
  • Finance and the Economic of Uncertainty with Guy Laroque, Blackwell, 2006, 281 p.
  • Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs and Coalitions, Editeurs Demange G. et Wooders M., Cambridge University Press, 2005, 480 p.
  • Finance et économie de l’incertain, avec G. Laroque, Economica, 2001, 267 p.
  • Théorie des jeux et analyse économique, avec J.P. Ponssard, Presses universitaires de France, 1994, 233 p.
  • Méthodes mathématiques de la finance, avec J.C. Rochet, Paris, Economica, 1992, 303 p, seconde édition, 1997, troisième édition, collection “Economie et statistiques avancées”, 2005