Jean-François Laslier

PSE Chaired Professor

CV IN FRENCH CV IN ENGLISH
Other social network Website RePEc page
  • Senior Researcher
  • CNRS
Research groups
  • Associate researcher at the Opening Economics Chair.
Research themes
  • Behavioral political economy
  • Experimental Economics
  • Individual Behaviour
  • Political and social behavior
  • Social Choice Theory
  • Sports Economics
Contact

Address :48 Boulevard Jourdan,
75014 Paris, France

Campus: Campus Jourdan
Floor: 3
Office: 03
Declaration of interest

Publications HAL

  • Compter les voix et « optimiser » la démocratie ? Pre-print, Working paper

    L’article est consacré à l’organisation des scrutins et au comptage des voix dans trois cas de complexité croissante : La répartition des sièges entre pays (exemple du Parlement Européen), la répartition des sièges entre partis politiques, et le choix des projets dans le cas d’un budget participatif. Ces questions techniques mettent en œuvre des concepts fondamentaux de philosophie morale et politique à la manière de la philosophie économique, en particulier les arbitrages entre efficacité et égalité.

    Published in

  • Does universalization ethics justify participation in large elections? Pre-print, Working paper

    What drives voters’ decisions to participate in large elections under costly voting, despite the rational expectation that this has no impact on the outcome? We propose a new model of ethical voters, by positing that they have Kantian or semi-Kantian preferences. With such preferences, voters evaluate their behavior in light of what the outcome would be, should a fraction of the other voters choose the same course of action. The “other voters” can be either the entire population (“non-partisan ethics”) or the individuals with same interest (“partisan ethics”). In a model with two candidates and a continuum of voters, we find that turnout is strictly positive as soon as the evaluation by the voters of the political outcome is not strictly of the “winner-take-all” kind. Moreover, the equilibrium turnout rates depend on the specifics of the election at hand, such as the relative stake of the election for the two supporter groups and the presence of core constituent groups.
    Author: Ingela Alger

    Published in

All publications