Stéphane Gauthier

PSE Professor

RePEc page
  • Professor
  • Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Research groups
Research themes
  • Contract Theory and Mechanism Design
  • Game Theory
  • Green Taxation
  • Public policy
Contact

Address :48, Boulevard Jourdan,
75014 Paris, France

Campus: Campus Jourdan
Floor: 4
Office: 16
Declaration of interest

Publications HAL

  • Weak redistribution and certainty equivalent domination Journal article

    We assess optimal deterministic nonlinear income taxation in a Mirrlees economy with a continuum of risk‐averse agents whose utilities are quasilinear in labor. A weak redistribution motive makes random taxes more likely socially dominated by the deterministic policy where after‐tax income lotteries are replaced with their certainty equivalents.
    Journal: Journal of Public Economic Theory

    Published in

  • Targeting taxes on local externalities Journal article

    We consider optimal anonymous consumption taxes in situations where the magnitude of an externality varies with individuals who cause it. For instance, urban fuel consumers generate greater pollution damages compared to rural consumers, but both groups are subjected to the same fuel tax. We provide a condition for the validity of the targeting principle, where external concerns are only addressed through the tax imposed on the commodity responsible for the externality. When this condition holds, one can separate the equity/efficiency and environmental components of this tax. An illustration suggests that Pigovian considerations explain most of the fuel tax in France.
    Author: Fanny Henriet Journal: Annals of Economics and Statistics

    Published in

  • Incertitude stratégique et taille de marché: le cas de l’amendement Wright Journal article

    Cet article exploite l’abrogation de l’amendement Wright en 2014 aux États-Unis pour illustrer les conséquences d’un élargissement du marché pertinent sur la capacité des entreprises `a se coordonner sur un équilibre de Nash. A partir de données sur l’industrie du transport aérien, une procédure d’estimation en double-différences met en lumière la baisse de qualité ́e des prévisions des compagnies aériennes sur les marchés de Dallas après que des services longue distance impliquant l’aéroport Love Field ont été autorisés. Ce résultat suggère que les autorités de la concurrence devraient être prudentes lorsqu’elles se réfèrent à l’équilibre de Nash à la suite de réformes d’expansion du marché
    Journal: Revue Economique

    Published in

  • Strategic uncertainty and market size: An illustration on the Wright amendment Pre-print, Working paper

    This paper exploits the repeal of the Wright amendment as a natural experiment in order to contribute to the ongoing discussion on how the enlargement of the relevant market affects the ability of firms to coordinate on a Nash equilibrium. Using data on the U.S. air transportation industry, we present a Difference-inDifference procedure which sheds light on the significant loss of accuracy in airlines’ predictions in markets originating in Dallas after the Love Field airport started operating long distance services in 2014. This suggests that competition authorities should be careful when they refer to the Nash equilibrium following market expansion reforms.

    Published in

  • Certainty Equivalence and Noisy Redistribution Pre-print, Working paper

    This paper assesses the usefulness of stochastic contracts in the presence of informational asymmetries. It identifies circumstances where a stochastic redistribution policy is socially dominated by the deterministic policy where after-tax income lotteries are replaced with their certainty equivalent. It also provides a parametric example where every stochastic menu which has the optimal deterministic menu as certainty equivalent is dominated by the deterministic menu, while there exist feasible and incentive compatible lotteries improving locally upon the deterministic menu.
    Author: Guy Laroque

    Published in

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Positions

Professor at University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne

Associate professor at Paris School of Economics

Research Fellow of the Institute for Fiscal Studies

 
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