Giacomo Weber

PhD student

Website
  • Paris School of Economics, EHESS
Research groups
Research themes
  • Bounded rationality
  • Game Theory
  • Mechanism Design and Economics of Contract
Contact

Address :48, boulevard Jourdan,
75014 Paris, France

Campus: Campus Jourdan
Building: R Floor: 2
Office: 17
Thesis title:
Bounded rationality and the Analogy-based Expectation Equilibrium
  • Thesis supervisor: Philippe Jehiel
  • Academic year of registration: 2019/2020
Declaration of interest

Publications HAL

  • Forthcoming : Endogenous clustering and analogy-based expectation equilibrium Journal article

    Normal-form two-player games are categorized by players into K analogy classes so as to minimize the prediction error about the behavior of the opponent. This results in Clustered Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibria in which strategies are analogy-based expectation equilibria given the analogy partitions and analogy partitions minimize the prediction errors given the strategies. We distinguish between environments with self-repelling analogy partitions in which some mixing over partitions is required and environments with self-attractive partitions in which several analogy partitions can arise, thereby suggesting new channels of belief heterogeneity and equilibrium multiplicity. Various economic applications are discussed.
    Journal: Review of Economic Studies

    Published in

  • Calibrated Clustering and Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium Pre-print, Working paper

    Families of normal-form two-player games are categorized by players into K analogy classes applying the K-means clustering technique to the data generated by the distributions of opponent’s behavior. This results in Calibrated Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibria in which strategies are analogy-based expectation equilibria given the analogy partitions and analogy partitions are derived from the strategies by the K-means clustering algorithm. We discuss various concepts formalizing this, and observe that distributions over analogy partitions are sometimes required to guarantee existence. Applications to games with linear best-responses are discussed highlighting the differences between strategic complements and strategic substitutes.

    Published in

All publications

Tabs

My CV can be found here.