Publications by PSE researchers

Establishing a Ukrainian Development Bank is key to Ukraine’s post-war recovery, to foster both international trust and local ownership. This column describes how, drawing on lessons from the European national development banks and Ukraine’s recent reforms, a Ukrainian Development Bank could integrate existing financial structures, channel EU aid, support small and medium-sized enterprises, and drive economic modernisation. Balancing local ownership with robust governance and civil oversight to mitigate corruption risks will be crucial to ensure effective integration into the EU and sustainable development.

Advanced-economy central banks are currently experiencing losses. To examine how rate-tightening cycles affect central bank finances, we study the financial statements of ten advanced-economy central banks during the 1970s and 1980s, the most notable and comparable policy environment to the present. We find that central bank profits actually increased in response to the anti-inflationary measures of the 1980s. We thus discuss how central bank profits depend on their policy instruments as well as their balance-sheet position when rate tightening begins, rather than on the tightening per se. Unlike today, central banks in the 1980s avoided losses because they did not remunerate bank reserves and their balance sheets did not carry the legacy of a decade of large asset purchases at low interest rates and long maturity. Our counterfactuals show that only a combination of these factors could have triggered losses in the 1980s: none of them is sufficient on its own. When losses emerged in the late 1970s, before the Volcker shock, they were due to foreign exchange reserves depreciating. In these instances, when central banks carried them forward and did not rely on transfers from the government, there was no loss of central bank independence or their ability to fight inflation.

It is widely assumed that the renminbi (RMB) cannot acquire a meaningful place in central bank reserve portfolios without full liberalization of China's capital account. We argue that the RMB can in fact develop into an international reserve currency in the absence of capital‐account convertibility. Trade and investment links can drive use despite limited access to Chinese financial markets. But this route to currency internationalization requires policy support. China must provide access to RMB through loans and the People's Bank of China (PBoC) currency swaps. It must ensure the convertibility of RMB into US dollars in offshore markets. It must provide RMB services at a stable and predictable price. Currency internationalization without full capital‐account liberalization thus requires the RMB to be backed by dollar reserves, which the PBoC consequently will continue to hold and use. Hence, we do not foresee RMB internationalization as supplanting dollar dominance.

New data covering 23 countries reveal that banking crises of the Great Depression coincided with a sharp international increase in deposits at savings institutions and life insurance. Deposits fled from commercial banks to alternative forms of savings. This fueled a credit crunch since other institutions did not replace bank lending. While asset prices fell, savings held in savings institutions and life insurance companies increased as a share of GDP and in real terms. These findings provide new explanations for the fall in credit and aggregate demand in the 1930s. They illustrate the need to consider nonbank financial institutions when studying banking crises.

We study how central banks have used their balance sheet to absorb international monetary shocks since the late 19th century, thereby regaining some monetary policy autonomy in a context of financial openness. If the uncovered interest rate parity does not hold, an increase in the leading international interest rate may push up domestic interest rates in both fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. Central banks can partially insulate domestic short-term interest rates from this increase by expanding domestic assets. With a fixed exchange rate, this is in addition to the sterilization of foreign exchange interventions. Accounting for the response of central bank balance sheets to an exogenous international shock sheds light on some puzzling behavior of interest rates and exchange rates across international monetary regimes in history. This study is based on a new monthly dataset of central bank balance sheets, macroeconomic, and financial variables for 23 countries since 1891.

Using newly collected data at the city level between 1910 and 1938, this article shows that, after World War I, France experienced an unprecedented expansion in bank branches mostly due to the creation of temporary branches in rural areas. The banking crisis in early 1930s paused this expansion. Nevertheless, the number of bank branches per capita remained four times higher than before the war. Also, the expansion of bank branches was not associated with an increase in the ratio of bank assets to national income. These findings re-evaluate the Great Reversal hypothesis in banking and reveal the disconnection between geographical expansion of banks and standard measures of financial development. Both trends can be reconciled if one considers that banks are multi-product firms-not just lenders-and that competition for new customers is not always associated with greater credit activity.

I provide comments and replies to the seven insightful contributions that discussed “The Democratic Challenge of Central Bank Credit Policies” and the proposal for a European Credit Council. I review how interdisciplinary scholarship on the political economy of central banking have shown the limits of simple principal-agent framework applied to central bank power and legitimacy. I emphasize why a change to central bank independence is not necessary for a fundamental change in the financial system and credit policies. I also argue that deliberations can have strong effects on decision-making and that the power of the people is not restricted to the legislative power.

History suggests a conflict between current Basel III liquidity ratios and monetary policy, which we call the liquidity regulation dilemma. Although forgotten, liquidity ratios, named “securities-reserve requirements,” were widely used historically, but for monetary policy (not regulatory) reasons, as central bankers recognized the contractionary effects of these ratios. We build a model rationalizing historical policies: a tighter ratio reduces the quantity of assets that banks can pledge as collateral, thus increasing interest rates. Tighter liquidity regulation paradoxically increases the need for central bank's interventions. Liquidity ratios were also used to keep yields on government bonds low when monetary policy tightened.

This article provides a framework for understanding the economic role of central banks and their democratic legitimacy. I argue that thinking about the democratic challenges of central banking requires considering central banks’ insurance role and how their actions are part of credit policy . The contract between the central bank and the sovereign is incomplete because it cannot integrate all unforeseen contingencies, distributive consequences and interactions with other policies. This opens the door to viewing the legitimacy of central bank decisions through a process of deliberation, coordination and reflexivity, rather than only a delegation of power. I discuss a proposal for a European Credit Council, which would be a deliberative body aimed at strengthening Parliamentary power on monetary and credit policies, the democratic legitimacy of central bank policy in the Euro Area as well as its coordination with other European policies. More coordination, Parliamentary power and deliberation are consistent with central bank independence and aim to delimit more precisely the action of central banks within the macroeconomic and credit policies of the State.

Instead of presenting one aspect of government intervention and assessing its effects on economic growth or financial stability, new interdisciplinary research studies credit policy as a whole. It examines the multiple dimensions of state intervention in financial markets (to guide the development and allocation of credit) and assesses the institutional complementarities between them. Although mostly focused on the most interventionist period (1930s-1970s), this literature allows for a reinterpretation of previous studies of financial history that have long emphasised the role of the state in the financial sector since at least the 19th century. Beyond the dichotomy between bank-based and market-based financial systems, it highlights the importance of debt guarantees, subsidies, the role of development banks or specialised credit and savings institutions as well as central banks and their liquidity. Providing insurance to limit the risk of investments and savings is not specific to a neoliberal vision of the state aimed at helping markets to function properly. It has also characterised classical liberalism (19th century) and periods of greater state intervention (1930s-1970s). The financial instruments are not new, but the nature of public-private partnerships is. Current credit policies subsidize investment and saving but involve little control on the final use of funds nor constraints on the organization and income of subsidized companies.. Furthermore, current state strategies to attract funds target institutional investors rather than individual savers, and adopt the financial and governance criteria of the former. Much more research is needed to confirm or refute these preliminary hypotheses. Last, I argue two other issues that should receive more attention in analytical studies of credit policy: the ideology associated with different regimes of credit regulation and the link between credit policy and international political economy.

Long considered suboptimal, capital controls and FX interventions are now recognized as prudential measures. Yet, whether they are used in combination remains an open question. Thanks to a rich dataset from 1950, we investigate how the response of FX reserves to an exogenous US monetary shock depends on capital controls. The response is insignificant with a very close capital account. By contrast, for a significant number of countries, FX reserves and capital controls are combined to tame the effects of an international financial shock. Yet, as countries open up financially, FX reserves replace capital controls. There is no one-sizes-fits-all recipe.