Publications by PSE researchers

This paper shows that even moderate air pollution levels, such as those in Europe, harm the economy by reducing firm performance. Using monthly firm-level data from France, we estimate the causal impact of fine particulate matter (PM 2.5 ) on sales and worker absenteeism. Leveraging exogenous pollution shocks from local wind direction changes, we find that a 10 percent increase in monthly PM 2.5 exposure reduces firm sales by 0.4 percent on average over the next two months, with sector-specific variation. Simultaneously, sick leave rises by 1 percent. However, this labor supply reduction explains only a small part of the sales decline. Our evidence suggests that air pollution also reduces worker productivity and dampens local demand. Aligning air quality with WHO guidelines would yield economic benefits on par with the costs of regulation or the health benefits from reduced mortality.

The Clean Development Mechanism is one of three flexible mechanisms included in the Kyoto Protocol. It enables Annex I countries to finance emission reductions in developing (non-Annex I) countries and use the credits thus obtained to meet their quantified emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM had two objectives: to reduce the costs of compliance of the Annex I countries’ emission reduction commitments, and to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC. The major part of certified emission reductions (CERs) comes from renewable energy investments, reduction of non-CO2 greenhouse gases (HFCs, PFCs and N2O), and energy efficiency projects. The geographical distribution of projects and emission reductions is concentrated in a few countries: China, India, Brazil, and Mexico. A substantial amount of CERs was created under the CDM, but the uneven geographical distribution of projects and the lack of consistent control of projects’ contribution to sustainable development have been arguments to contend that the CDM did not fulfil its initial objectives. The restriction by the EU in 2013 to use CERs in the EU-ETS brought down prices and the market for CERs has not recovered since. The CDM was discontinued as of 30 June 2022 and requests for exemptions were considered on a case-specific basis. Nevertheless, the CDM has continued to function while parties are waiting for the flexible mechanisms created in the Paris Agreement of 2015 to become operational, in particular the Sustainable Development Mechanism of Article 6.4 which is similar to the CDM in its objectives.

Ce projet documente et analyse l’impact des aides à la décarbonation sur trois volets : le ciblage et le recours aux aides du plan France Relance, les effets économiques et environnementaux des précédentes vagues d’aides à la décarbonation et en particulier du Fonds Chaleur administré par l’Ademe, et les premiers effets rétrospectifs des impacts économiques des aides à la décarbonation du plan France Relance.

This study examines the causal impacts of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) on the environmental performance of Indian manufacturing firms, as measured by their energy use, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, and intensities of CO2 emissions per sales and per energy use. The impacts of CDM projects are estimated using either two-way fixed-effect regressions or an estimator built for an event study with staggered treatment (Sun and Abraham, 2021) combined with a sample of ever-treated firms only or a sample comparing treated to never-treated control firms using semi-parametric matching. We found that CDM projects significantly increased firms’ CO2 emissions and energy use after treatment, but had no effect on CO2 emission intensity per sales and only a small negative effect on the CO2 content of energy use (only for the matched sample). These results reveal that CDM projects led to a positive scale effect (increased sales) after investments were made, and that these investments triggered a limited emission-reducing technique effect (decreased CO2 intensity).

With asymmetric climate policies, regulation in one country can be undercut by missions growth in another. Previous research finds evidence that regulation erodes the competitiveness of domestic firms and leads to higher imports, but increased imports need not imply increased emissions if domestic sales are jointly determined with export sales or if emission intensity of manufacturing adjusts endogenously to foreign demand. In this paper, we estimate for the first time how production and emissions of manufacturing firms in one country respond to foreign demand shocks in trading partner markets. Using a panel of large Indian manufacturers and an instrumental variable strategy, we find that foreign demand growth leads to higher exports, domestic sales, production, and CO2 emissions, and slightly lower emission intensity. The results imply that a representative exporter facing the average observed foreign demand growth over the period 1995-2011 would have increased CO2 emissions by 1.39% annually as a result of foreign demand growth, which translates into 6.69% total increase in CO2 emissions from Indian manufacturing over the period. Breaking down emission intensity reduction into component channels, we find some evidence of product-mix effects, but fail to reject the null of no change in technology. Back of the envelope calculations indicate that environmental regulation that doubles energy prices world-wide (except in India) would only increase CO2 emissions from India by 1.5%. Thus, while leakage fears are legitimate, the magnitude appears fairly small in the context of India.

How do voters' behavioural biases affect political outcomes? We study this question in a model of Downsian electoral competition in which candidates have private information about the benefits of policies, and voters may infer candidates' information from their electoral platforms. If voters are Bayesian, candidates ‘anti-pander’ – they choose platforms that are more extreme than is justified by their private beliefs. However, anti-pandering is ameliorated if voters' inferences are subject to confirmation bias. Voter confirmation bias causes elections to aggregate candidates' information better, and all observers, whether biased or Bayesian, would like the voters in our model to exhibit more confirmation bias than they do themselves.

With asymmetric climate policies, regulation in one country can be undercut by missions growth in another. Previous research finds evidence that regulation erodes the competitiveness of domestic firms and leads to higher imports, but increased imports need not imply increased emissions if domestic sales are jointly determined with export sales or if emission intensity of manufacturing adjusts endogenously to foreign demand. In this paper, we estimate for the first time how production and emissions of manufacturing firms in one country respond to foreign demand shocks in trading partner markets. Using a panel of large Indian manufacturers and an instrumental variable strategy, we find that foreign demand growth leads to higher exports, domestic sales, production, and CO2 emissions, and slightly lower emission intensity. The results imply that a representative exporter facing the average observed foreign demand growth over the period 1995-2011 would have increased CO2 emissions by 1.39% annually as a result of foreign demand growth, which translates into 6.69% total increase in CO2 emissions from Indian manufacturing over the period. Breaking down emission intensity reduction into component channels, we find some evidence of product-mix effects, but fail to reject the null of no change in technology. Back of the envelope calculations indicate that environmental regulation that doubles energy prices world-wide (except in India) would only increase CO2 emissions from India by 1.5%. Thus, while leakage fears are legitimate, the magnitude appears fairly small in the context of India.

We explore the contribution of product mix in determining firm and aggregate emission intensity. First, using detailed firm-product emission intensity data from India, we find that more efficient firms are less emission intensive, and that products with the largest sales tend to be cleaner than other products within the firm. We also find that emission intensity in India dropped significantly between 1990-2010 through reallocations across firms, while product mix played a counteracting role in increasing firm emission intensity. Next, we develop a multi-product multi-factor model with heterogeneous firms, variable markups, and monopolistic competition in which each product has a specific emission intensity. We find that pro-competitive market developments lead to an improvement in the aggregate emission intensity – through reallocations across firms – even though firms can become dirtier or cleaner through product mix. This theoretical result fits particularly well the empirical facts.

How do voters' behavioural biases affect political outcomes? We study this question in a model of Downsian electoral competition in which office-motivated candidates have private information about the benefits of policies, and voters may infer candidates' information from their electoral platforms. If voters are Bayesian, candidates have strategic incentives to `anti-pander' { they choose platforms that are more extreme than is justified by their private beliefs. However, anti-pandering incentives are ameliorated if voters'inferences are subject to confirmation bias. Voter confirmation bias can thus counteract distortions due to the strategic interaction between candidates, potentially leading to welfare improvements. Indeed, we show that all observers, whether biased or Bayesian, would like the representative voter in our model to exhibit more confirmation bias than they do themselves.

Experts and the general public often perceive environmental problems differently. Moreover, regulatory responses to environmental issues often do not coincide with consensus expert recommendations. These two facts are mutually consistent—it is unlikely that regulations based on factual claims that are substantially different from voters’ opinions would be politically feasible. Given that the public’s beliefs constrain policy choices, it is vital to understand how beliefs are formed, whether they will be biased, and how the inevitable heterogeneity in people’s beliefs filters through the political system to affect policy. We review recent theoretical and empirical work on individual inference, social learning, and the supply of information by the media and identify the potential for biased beliefs to arise. We then examine the interaction between beliefs and politics: can national elections and legislative votes be expected to result in unbiased collective decisions, do heterogeneous beliefs induce strategic political actors to alter their policy choices, and how do experts and lobby groups affect the information available to policymakers? We conclude by suggesting that the relationship between beliefs and policy choices is a relatively neglected aspect of the theory of environmental regulation, and a fruitful area for further research.

La géographie des émissions de gaz à effet de serre a fortement évolué ces dernières décennies. Les pays émergents représentent une part croissante des émissions globales, même si leurs émissions par habitant restent relativement faibles par rapport aux pays industrialisés. Ces pays sont de plus en plus intégrés dans le commerce mondial, et l’intégration peut être perçue comme favorisant la croissance des émissions mondiales selon l’hypothèse des « havres de pollution » (Copeland et Taylor [1995]). Si les entreprises polluantes choisissent de se relocaliser dans des pays à faibles régulations environnementales, tout en exportant leurs produits vers les pays développés, le commerce peut exacerber les externalités environnementales et contribuer à l’augmentation du niveau global d’émissions.

This paper examines how income-induced environmental policy differences and damage heterogeneity interact to determine the comparative advantage in a polluting activity. In a non-cooperative framework, North and South regulate two types of pollution, local pollution (e.g., air and water pollution) and global pollution (e.g., greenhouse gas emissions), each of which induces heterogeneous damages for consumers. I find that (1) North or South can have the comparative advantage in the dirty sector; (2) whatever the region with this comparative advantage, the worldwide level of global pollution can either increase or decrease with trade; (3) local and global emissions evolve symmetrically in each region with trade, even though pollution regulations may be asymmetric.