Publications by PSE researchers

Au 1er janvier 2024, la France comptait 68,4 millions d’habitants, soit 230 000 de plus qu’au 1er janvier 2023. Le solde naturel a atteint un niveau historiquement bas depuis l’après-guerre et depuis 2018, et le solde migratoire est le principal moteur démographique du pays. Deuxième pays le plus peuplé de l’UE27 (15,2 % de la population), la France présente toutefois un accroissement légèrement inférieur à celui de la moyenne européenne et demeure un peu plus jeune que la moyenne de l’UE, mais vieillit plus rapidement. En 2022, les flux d’entrées de ressortissants de pays tiers ont augmenté et atteignent le niveau le plus élevé depuis 2000 (282 957 personnes). L’année 2022 est marquée par une augmentation conséquente de la part des flux pour raisons professionnelles (+ 4 points) et par une féminisation de ces derniers (+ 15 points). La France est le 5e pays de l’UE27 pour le flux migratoire, mais se trouve seulement en 21e position si l’on tient compte de la taille de la population. En 2023, la baisse historique du nombre de naissances est la conséquence de celle de la fécondité (1,67 enfant par femme), niveau le plus faible observé depuis l’après-guerre. La baisse concerne tous les groupes d’âges. Le profil de la fécondité par âge en France est proche de celui des pays d’Europe de l’Ouest et du Nord, et la proportion de naissances hors mariage y est la plus élevée d’Europe (65,2 %). En 2023, le nombre d’avortements augmente pour la deuxième année consécutive, et 8 avortements sur 10 sont désormais médicamenteux. Quand on rapporte ce chiffre au nombre de femmes de 15 à 49 ans, la France enregistre, avec la Suède, le taux de recours à l’avortement le plus élevé d’Europe, mais c’est aussi un des pays où la réglementation est la moins restrictive. Le nombre de mariages augmente très légèrement en 2023, tout comme celui des pacs en 2022 (année la plus récente disponible), mais le rattrapage post-Covid n’est que partiel. La part des pacs et des mariages entre personnes de même sexe reste relativement stable en 2023 et, avec un âge moyen au mariage qui continue d’augmenter, la France se rapproche des pays du Sud et de l’Ouest de l’Europe, où le mariage est moins précoce que dans les pays de l’Est. En baisse depuis 3 ans, le nombre de décès reste plus élevé que celui observé avant la pandémie (2019). En revanche, l’espérance de vie en 2023 est supérieure à celle de 2019, pour les hommes comme pour les femmes, même si le rebond en France est inférieur à celui observé dans d’autres pays d’Europe. Comparée aux autres pays européens, la mortalité française reste relativement basse aux âges plus élevés, mais le pays montre un retard important et croissant pour la mortalité infantile. L’écart de mortalité entre les hommes et les femmes est plus élevé que dans la moyenne européenne, même s’il continue de baisser. Le cancer est la première cause de mortalité en France, alors qu’il s’agit des maladies cardiovasculaires à l’échelle européenne.

This paper disentangles the relationship between COVID-19 propagation and mobility. In a theoretical model allowing mobility to be endogenously determined by the COVID-19 prevalence rate, we show that an exogenous epidemic shock has an immediate effect on mobility whereas an exogenous mobility shock influences epidemic variables with a delay. In the long run, exogenous disease contagiousness and mobility jointly shape epidemiological outcomes. The short-run theoretical result allows us to recover, empirically, the causal impacts of mobility and COVID-19 hospitalisations on each other in France. We find that hospitalisations are highly sensitive to mobility whereas mobility is little influenced by hospitalisations. In France, it seems therefore that voluntary social distancing would not have been effective to control the epidemic, in the absence of social distancing mandates.

We provide one of the first formalizations of a vaccination campaign in a decisiontheoretic framework. We analyse a model where an ambiguity-averse individual must decide how much effort to invest into prevention in the context of a rampant disease. We study how ambiguity aversion affects the effort and the estimation of the vaccine efficacy in clinical trials and immunization campaigns. We find that the behaviours of individuals participating in a clinical trial differ from individuals not participating. Individuals who are more optimistic toward vaccination participate more in trials. Their behaviours and efforts are also affected. As a result, because vaccine efficacy depends on unobserved behaviours and efforts, the biological effect of the vaccine becomes difficult to evaluate. During the scale-up phase of a vaccination campaign, provided that vaccine efficacy is established, we show that vaccine hesitancy may still be rational.

En janvier 2023, la France comptait 68 millions d’habitants, soit 200 000 de plus qu’en janvier 2022. Les naissances ont diminué et les décès augmenté : le solde naturel baisse, atteignant un niveau historiquement faible et inférieur au solde migratoire. En 2022, la France fait partie des 6 pays européens parmi les 27 dont le solde naturel est positif, mais son solde migratoire est relativement faible : l’accroissement de la population française est deux fois moindre que celui de l’UE27. En 2021, les flux d’entrées de personnes venant de pays tiers avec un titre de séjour augmentent par rapport à 2020, pour retrouver leur niveau d’avant la crise sanitaire. En 2022, l’indice conjoncturel de fécondité diminue (1,8 enfant par femme) et atteint son niveau le plus bas depuis 20 ans. Toutefois, le renouvellement des générations nées jusqu’en 1992 semble assuré. La fécondité des hommes est plus forte que celle des femmes, principalement du fait des enfants nés après leur 50 ans. Le recours à l’avortement est en augmentation entre 2021 et 2022, et plus fréquent dans les groupes d'âges auxquels la fécondité est élevée. La part des IVG réalisées par la méthode médicamenteuse continue sa progression, tout comme celles pratiquées par les sages-femmes. En 2022, le rattrapage des mariages qui n’ont pas pu être célébrés en 2020 et 2021 se poursuit. Le nombre de mariages augmente ; en revanche, le nombre de pacs diminue dans les couples hétérosexuels. Cependant, le nombre de pacs augmente pour les couples de même sexe et n’a jamais été aussi élevé. L’écart d’âge entre les conjoints diminue légèrement, mais subsiste notamment pour les couples d’hommes. Le nombre de décès reste important en 2022 malgré une amélioration de la situation sanitaire : 2 épidémies de grippe et 3 épisodes caniculaires expliquent une surmortalité de 45 800 décès. L’espérance de vie à la naissance augmente en 2022 pour les hommes et pour les femmes, mais ne retrouve pas son niveau d’avant la pandémie. La France reste l’un des pays d’Europe de l’Ouest dont l’écart d’espérance de vie entre les hommes et les femmes est parmi les plus importants (6 ans), même si cet écart diminue constamment depuis 1980.

Many recent studies show that Europe has had a lower mortality inequality for most ages than the United States over the last thirty years. However, the evolution of the income gradient in mortality all along the twentieth century remains poorly understood. This article uses a unique dataset that gives the annual lifetables and fiscal income for the 90 administrative regions of mainland France from 1922 to 2020. The income gradients in mortality are computed across regions using a traditional method with calendar ages and, alternatively, with mortality milestones to control for the increase in life expectancy over time. The study reveals a systematic reversal of the gradient that occurred around the 1970s for both sexes and all ages or mortality groups when calculated at an aggregated level. Inequality in mortality amongst the oldest age groups has however returned to a level observed at least ten years earlier because of Covid-19, even after controlling for mortality improvements over the period.

This paper explores the impact of a health shock and changes in survival probability on the savings and portfolio choices of older individuals. Using a theoretical framework featuring a portfolio choice that incorporates imperfect annuity markets, we analyze how elderly individuals, whose survival probability has been altered by a health shock, allocate their resources. A difference-indifferences approach complements the theoretical approach by taking into account the effect of age and cohort, and controlling for selection bias related to health events at older ages. Our analysis utilizes a panel of 5570 observations from the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE, 2011 and 2017). Both theoretical and empirical findings converge, indicating that experiencing a health accident such as a stroke or heart attack leads to a decrease in safe savings. Consequently, investing in annuities becomes crucial in enabling individuals to mitigate the consequences of poor health in aging economies.

This paper disentangles the relationship between COVID-19 propagation and mobility. In a theoretical model allowing mobility to be endogenously determined by the COVID-19 prevalence rate, we show that an exogenous epidemic shock has an immediate effect on mobility whereas an exogenous mobility shock influences epidemic variables with a delay. In the long run, exogenous disease contagiousness and mobility jointly shape epidemiological outcomes. The short-run theoretical result allows us to recover, empirically, the causal impacts of mobility and COVID-19 hospitalisations on each other in France. We find that hospitalisations are highly sensitive to mobility whereas mobility is little influenced by hospitalisations. In France, it seems therefore that voluntary social distancing would not have been effective to control the epidemic, in the absence of social distancing mandates.

The participation of older workers in the labor market has increased in most high-income countries since the mid-1990s. This can be explained by changes in the characteristics of recent generations of older workers. The labor supply is healthier and better trained and includes more women. This can also be explained by reforms of retirement systems and of health and unemployment insurance systems, even if modifications may still be required to guarantee sustainability. In addition, recurring concerns about the productivity of older workers and their ability to adapt to technological change seem unfounded and likely to stem from prejudice against them. Finally, the promises associated with greater flexibility in working conditions have not, to date, led to a significant increase in the work of older individuals.

On 1 January 2023, the population of France was 68 million, 200,000 more than on 1 January 2022. The number of births decreased in 2022 while deaths increased. Consequently, natural increase dipped to an all-time low, contributing less to population growth than net migration. France was among just six of the 27 European Union member countries with positive natural increase in 2022, but as net migration was quite low, its population growth was half that of the European Union as a whole. In 2021, admissions of third-country nationals requiring a residence permit were higher than in 2020, returning to the level recorded before the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, the total fertility rate fell to 1.8 children per women, its lowest level in 20 years. That said, fertility should reach replacement level up to the 1992 birth cohort at least. Men have higher fertility than women, mainly because of births beyond age 50. The number of abortions increased between 2021 and 2022, and abortion rates were especially high at ages of peak fertility. The share of medical abortions and of abortions managed by a midwife continued to increase. The number of marriages increased in 2022, among different-sex couples especially, due partly to the catch-up of marriages that could not be celebrated in 2020 and 2021. The number of PACS civil unions fell, however, due to a decrease among different-sex couples, although PACS unions between same-sex couples reached a record high. The age difference between partners fell slightly, but still persists, between male same-sex partners especially. Despite a slowing of the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of deaths remained high in 2022. Two flu epidemics and three heatwaves resulted in 45,800 excess deaths. Life expectancy at birth increased in 2022 for both sexes but did not return to its pre-pandemic level. France is still among the Western European countries with the highest gender gap in life expectancy (6 years), although it has been narrowing steadily since 1980.

Background: Influenza mortality has dramatically decreased in France since the 1950s. Annual death rates peaked during two pandemics: the Asian flu (1956–1957) and the Hong Kong flu (1969–1970). Objective: This study’s objective is to evaluate whether the second pandemic created a structural change in the dynamics of influenza mortality in France. Methods: We employ a new database on influenza mortality since 1950 at the subnational level (90 geographic areas) to estimate statistical models to find out whether a structural change happened and to explain the differences in mortality rates across geographic areas. Influenza mortality increased between 1950 and 1969 and decreased from 1970 onward. Conclusions: The Hong Kong flu is identified as the event of a structural break. After the break, geographical differences are less explained by regional characteristics such as income, density, or aging ratio. The Hong Kong flu was found to be associated with a major change in influenza mortality in France. Change in health practices and policies induced a decline in mortality that started in 1970, just after the pandemic. The health benefits are notably important for senior citizens and for the poorest regions. Contribution: We employ a new database on influenza mortality since 1950 at the subnational level (90 geographic areas). Change in health practices and policies induced a decline in mortality that started in 1970, just after the pandemics. The health benefits are notably important for senior citizens and for the poorest regions.

We revisit the standard theoretical model of tax competition to consider imperfect mobility of both capital and labor. We show that the mobility of one factor affects the taxation of both factors and that the ”race-to-the-bottom” narrative (with burden shifting) applies essentially to capital-exporting countries. We validate our predictions using a panel of 29 OECD countries over the period of 1997–2017. The quantitative contribution of rising capital mobility to the decline of corporate income tax rates over our sample period is nonetheless less than that of population ageing.

Intra-generational inequalities focus on the distributions within age groups. On the basis of French household income surveys carried out from 1996 to 2014, the Gini coefficient and D9/D1 inter-decile ratio were calculated so as to evaluate intra-generational income inequality before and after redistribution by the tax and welfare system. Age-Cohort-Period models were then estimated in order to disentangle age and generation effects. Over a life cycle, intra-generational inequality displays a hump-shaped curve peaking at age 55-59. This inequality is significantly lower among the youngest, whichever inequality indicator is used, and among the oldest, when measured by the inter-decile ratio. Comparison of pre-and postredistribution income reveals that the tax and welfare system particularly reduces inequality among the young. Intra-generational inequality measured by the Gini coefficient increases significantly from one generation to the next. Measured by the inter-decile ratio, the increase is considerable for the gross income of those generations born from the 1970s on. However, the tax and welfare system has compensated for this increase, because analysis of the interdecile ratio applied to disposable income shows no significant difference between generations.