A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes

Journal article: The classical Shapley value is the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition $N$ when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general coalition formation model where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain and need not finish with the grand coalition. This note provides an axiomatization which is only slightly weaker than the original one but allows a much more transparent proof. Moreover, the logical independence of the axioms is exhibited.

Author(s)

Ulrich Faigle, Michel Grabisch

Journal
  • Economic Theory Bulletin
Date of publication
  • 2013
Keywords JEL
C71
Keywords
  • Coalitional game
  • Coalition formation process
  • Shapley value
Pages
  • 189-199
Version
  • 1