A game of hide and seek in networks
Journal article: We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.
Author(s)
Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta, Marcin Dziubiński
Journal
- Journal of Economic Theory
Date of publication
- 2020
Keywords JEL
Keywords
- Network design
- Hide and seek
- Covert organizations
- Networks
Pages
- 105119
URL of the HAL notice
Version
- 1
Volume
- 190