Thesis: This dissertation offers an empirical investigation of the links between the political sphere and the management of local public services in France. When they administer public services, local governments can decide either to provide a service in-house, or to externalize its management, and therefore conclude contracts with private entities. First, this choice of governance is analyzed in the case of French school canteens and the political drivers of this choice are highlighted. The political contestation in the municipal election is found to be one of the drivers of the organizational choice. Second, we analyzed public-private contracts in case of externalization. We found those contracts to be more rigid than pure private contracts. Besides, this excessive rigidity can be explained by the level of political contestation in the municipality. Finally, the determinants of the local food supply is studied. We find that the availability of alternative food networks is sometimes driven by political considerations. This dissertation contributes to add knowledge to the understanding of the management of local public services, as well as to the understanding of food retail stores availability.