Pre-print, Working paper: When bidders are not substitutes, we show that there is no standard ascend-ing auction that implements a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium under truthful bidding. Such an impossibility holds also in environments where the Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium payoff and is thus stronger than de Vries, Schummer and Vohra s [On ascending Vickrey auctions for het-erogeneous objects, J. Econ. Theory, 132, 95-118] impossibility result with regards to the Vickrey payoff vector under general valuations. Similarly to Mishra and Parkes [Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations, J. Econ. Theory, 132, 335-366], the impossibility can be circumvented by giving price discounts to the bidders from the final vector of prices. Nevertheless, the similarity is misleading: the solution we propose satisfies a minimality infor-mation revelation property that fails to be satisfied in any ascending auction that implements the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. We investigate related issues when strictly positive increments have to be used under general continuous valuations.