Can We Identify the Fed’s Preferences?

Pre-print, Working paper: Using US data, we estimate optimal policy with a probability below one that the Fed reneges on its commitment ("limited credibility") versus discretionary policy where the Fed reneges on its commitment at all periods with a probability equal to one ("zero credibility"). The transmission mechanism is the new-Keynesian Phillips curve with auto-correlated cost-push shock. It includes the labor cost channel or the working capital channel. Discretion with zero credibility of the Fed is rejected. The working capital channel fits the data before Volcker's mandate. The labor cost channel fits the data since Volcker's mandate.

Author(s)

Jean-Bernard Chatelain, Kirsten Ralf

Date of publication
  • 2017
Keywords JEL
C61 C62 E31 E52 E58
Keywords
  • Ramsey optimal policy
  • Zero-credibility policy
  • Identification
  • Central bank preferences
  • New-Keynesian Phillips curve
  • Working capital channel
Internal reference
  • PSE Working Papers n°2017-25
Version
  • 3