Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
Journal article: I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player's payoff depends on his own and his neighbors' actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not the actions of his neighbors. Players can communicate costlessly at each stage: communication can be public, private or a mixture of both. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. First, for any network, a folk theorem holds if some Joint Pairwise Identifiability condition regarding payoff functions is satisfied. Second, a necessary and sufficient condition on the network topology for a folk theorem to hold for all payoff functions is that no two players have the same set of neighbors not counting each other.
Author(s)
Marie Laclau
Journal
- Games and Economic Behavior
Date of publication
- 2014
Keywords JEL
Keywords
- Communication
- Folk theorem
- Imperfect private monitoring
- Networks
- Repeated games
Pages
- 136–160
URL of the HAL notice
Version
- 1
Volume
- 87