Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks

Journal article: We characterize the optimal contract for resource extraction in a context where the concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. The dynamics of extraction is characterized by a virtual Hotelling rule in which costs of extraction are replaced with virtual costs of extraction. We analyze how structural breaks in the price of resource impact the dynamics of extraction.

Author(s)

David Martimort, Jérôme Pouyet, Francesco Ricci

Journal
  • Annals of Economics and Statistics
Date of publication
  • 2018
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Keywords
  • Non-Renewable Resource Management
  • Delegated Management
  • Optimal Contract
  • Asymmetric Information
Pages
  • 81
URL of the HAL notice
Version
  • 1