Coordination with communication under oath
Journal article: We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.
Author(s)
Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Jason F Shogren, Adam Zylbersztejn
Journal
- Experimental Economics
Date of publication
- 2018
Keywords JEL
Keywords
- Coordination game
- Cheap talk communication
- Oath
Pages
- 627-649
URL of the HAL notice
Version
- 1
Volume
- 21