Coordination with communication under oath

Journal article: We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.

Author(s)

Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Jason F Shogren, Adam Zylbersztejn

Journal
  • Experimental Economics
Date of publication
  • 2018
Keywords JEL
C72 D83
Keywords
  • Coordination game
  • Cheap talk communication
  • Oath
Pages
  • 627-649
Version
  • 1
Volume
  • 21