Thesis: The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of money, especially of bank deposits,in Irving Fisher’s (1867–1947) analysis of the general level of activity determination, which constitutes nowadays the foundation of the contemporary quantitative theory.We show how his explanation of monetary instability evolves by comparing his credit cycle theory (1911) with the debt-deflation (1932, 1933). Our aim is to highlight the influence of the development of bank currency (from the end of the 19th century) and financial markets (during the interwar period) on Fisher’s economic thought, and through him, on the liberal conception of monetary neutrality. In this way, we draw the logical structures of its two analyses, by pointing out that they are based on qualitatively different mechanisms, one banking, and the other one financial, involving variables and processes of different nature. However, once this heterogeneousness advanced, it is possible to reconcile the two theories of Fisher by underlining a deeper invariance concerning the destabilizing character of money. That is why his two big reforms projects, the compensated-dollar (1911, 1920), and then the 100% Money (1935), are intended to answer at the same purpose: stabilize the value of money.Chapter 1 introduces the dynamic of the debt-deflation to discuss his relation with thecredit cycle theory in the chapter 2. In the latter, we assert that this analysis of Fisher is only a particular case of a more general model in which, contrary to what he thinks at the time, the stability of the equilibrium is not guaranteed. In the chapter 3, we discuss the solutions he proposed to solve the monetary disorders. More precisely, we specify the links between his perception of instability and the reforms he suggests to neutralize the influence of money on the real economic variables. In the chapter 4, we pursue our study of Fisher’s conception of instability by examining the logical and historical foundations of the notion of “Fisher effect” in the meaning given by James Tobin (1980). Finally, the chapter 5 deals with the reception and the posterity of Fisher’s ideas regarding financial instability. We show that the debt-deflation is neither ignored, nor totally rejected by the economists in the 1930s and 1940s, then that it occupies an important place from 1970s in the constitution of the neo-Keynesian and post-Keynesian research program.