Endogenous preferences in games with Type-Indeterminate Players

Journal article: The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we extend the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making and show that TI-games open a new field of strategic interaction. We first establish an equivalence result between static games of incomplete information and static TI-games. We next develop a new solution concept for non-commuting dynamic TI-games. The updating rule captures the novelty brought about by Type Indeterminacy namely that in addition to affecting information and payoffs, the action of a player impacts on the profile of types. We provide an example showing that TI-game predictions cannot be obtained as Bayes Nash equilibrium of the corresponding classical game.

Author(s)

Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky

Journal
  • AAAI Press Menlo Park
Date of publication
  • 2010
Keywords
  • Type indeterminacy
  • Games
  • Endogeneous preferences
Pages
  • 70-77
Version
  • 1