Thesis: Weakly institutionalized environments represent a fertile ground for conflicts and for the suboptimal exploitation of resources. This dissertation explores these themes using a combination of theory and field experiments. Chapter 1, joint with Francis Bloch, studies the phenomenon of information distortion with a simple model of communication in networks. Agents can influence the probability that the information they send is transmitted without distortion, by exerting a costly and continuous effort. We characterize the equilibria of the game in function of the timing of agents’ decisions and of communication costs. Chapter 2, joint with Juni Singh, looks into the endogenous demand of peer-monitoring institutions in rural Nepal and studies its effect on contributions to a public good. Socially sparse groups are more likely to elect a highly influential monitor compared to socially dense ones. Monitoring institutions that are democratically elected by groups increase cooperation compared to those that are externally imposed, but only in socially sparse groups. Chapter 3 offers a model of conflict delegation with adverse selection, where states employ local groups to fight on their behalf. In a setting with incomplete information, militias receive transfers that are smaller than in complete information but are left with higher political autonomy. Chapter 4 extends this framework investigating the tradeoffs of delegating conflict and studies the effect of competition between different sponsors willing to hire the same local group. The delegation of conflict is the unique equilibrium when local groups enjoy weak local support. When there is competition between two sponsors, the delegate can carve out higher rents compared to a situation of monopoly contracting.