Further analysis on leadership in tax competition: the role of capital ownership—a comment
Journal article: Ogawa (Int Tax Public Financ 20(3):474–484, 2013) discusses the analysis of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J Public Econ 94(9–10):768–776, 2010a) by taking into account capital ownership in the government’s objective functions. He establishes that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the endogenous timing game corresponds to the simultaneous Nash equilibrium. This result contrasts with Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J Public Econ 94(9–10):768–776, 2010a) who conclude to the existence of two Stackelberg outcomes at the SPNEs. Highlighting the role of plain complementarity or substitutability, we obtain conditions under which leadership still emerges at the equilibrium of the endogenous timing game when capital ownership is considered. Numerical simulations confirm this finding and display a case where plain properties are not monotone and a well-identified Stackelberg outcome is the SPNE.
Author(s)
Hubert Kempf, Grégoire Rota-Graziosi
Journal
- International Tax and Public Finance
Date of publication
- 2015
Keywords
- Endogenous timing
- Tax competition
- First/second-mover advantage
- Plain complements/substitutes
- Stackelberg
Pages
- 1028-1039
URL of the HAL notice
Version
- 1
Volume
- 22