Pre-print, Working paper: It is argued that the conventional analysis of the 2001 Argentina crisis in terms of populist budgetary policies and institutional rigidities of labor market is not satisfactory. The 2001 collapse takes place within a long history, but it results from a quite specific factor: the structural unbalance within the accumulation regime implied by the convertibility and the complete opening to world trade and financial globalization. The shakiness of major institutional compromises and the lack of policy tools to respond to the vagaries of the world economy explain the 1998 turning point from growth to depression. The fast economic recovery observed since 2002, associated to the default of public debt and the pesification, does not mean that Argentina has definitely overcome the structural obstacles that have been hindering its growth since 1976. The likelihood and resilience of alternative development modes is finally discussed. It is difficult to overcome the logic of a primary product exporter country. Of course, its potential is larger in the 2000s, but this economic regime is not totally transformed by the expected medium term rise of commodities prices at the world level.