On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
Journal article: The literature on ascending combinatorial auctions yields conflicting insights regarding the possibility to implement the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. We introduce the class of minimal ascending auctions, a class which allows one to disconnect the final payments from the final bids but which prohibits the raising of the price vector of a provisionally winning bidder. We first establish the impossibility of implementing the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. Second, we propose a minimal ascending auction that yields a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium thanks to payment discounts.
Author(s)
Laurent Lamy
Journal
- Games and Economic Behavior
Date of publication
- 2012
Keywords JEL
Keywords
- Ascending auctions
- Combinatorial auctions
- Bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium
- Core-selecting auctions
- Vickrey payoffs
Pages
- 990-999
URL of the HAL notice
Version
- 1
Volume
- 75