Social Learning with Coarse Inference
Journal article: We study social learning by boundedly rational agents. Agents take a decision in sequence, after observing their predecessors and a private signal. They are unable to make perfect inferences from their predecessors' decisions: they only understand the relation between the aggregate distribution of actions and the state of nature, and make their inferences accordingly. We show that, in a discrete action space, even if agents receive signals of unbounded precision, there are asymptotic inefficiencies. In a continuous action space, compared to the rational case, agents overweight early signals. Despite this behavioral bias, eventually agents learn the realized state of the world and choose the correct action.
Author(s)
Antonio Guarino, Philippe Jehiel
Journal
- American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Date of publication
- 2013
Keywords JEL
Pages
- 147-174
URL of the HAL notice
Version
- 1
Volume
- 5