Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary
Pre-print, Working paper: This notes reports part of a larger study of "petty corruption" by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition for approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are "socially efficient", and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrat's bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.
Author(s)
Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Mukul Majumdar, Radner Roy
Date of publication
- 2007
Keywords JEL
Keywords
- Petty corruption
- Intermediaries
- Game theory
Internal reference
- PSE Working Papers n°2007-38
URL of the HAL notice
Version
- 1