The Core for Games with Cooperation Structure
Book section: A cooperative game consists of a set of players and a characteristic function that determines the maximal profit or minimal cost that each subset of players can get when they decide to cooperate, regardless of the actions of the rest of the players. The relationships among the players can modify their bargaining and therefore their payoffs. The model of cooperation structures in a game introduces a graph on the set of players setting their relations and in which its components indicate the groups of players that are initially formed. In this paper we define the core and the Weber set and the notion of convexity for this family of games.
Author(s)
Inés Gallego, Michel Grabisch, Andres Jiménez-Losada, Alexandre Skoda
Publisher(s)
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Scientific editor(s)
- Ngoc Thanh Nguyen, Ryszard Kowalczyk, Jacek Mercik
Title of the work
- Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII
Date of publication
- 2016
Keywords
- Cooperative game
- A priori unions
- Core
- Weber set
- Cooperation structure
- Convexity
Pages
- 172-188
URL of the HAL notice
Version
- 1