The strategy structure of some coalition formation games

Pre-print, Working paper: In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared. The predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully. These difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form, as the collection of pairs of buyer-seller in an assignment game. The incentive properties of the core and of its selections are investigated in function of the collection. Furthermore the relationships with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are drawn.

Author(s)

Gabrielle Demange

Date of publication
  • 2006
Keywords JEL
C71 D7
Keywords
  • Coalition formation
  • Assignment
  • Manipulability
  • Substitutes
  • Incremental value
  • Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
Internal reference
  • PSE Working Papers n°2006-38
Version
  • 1